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Introduction
To Abraham Lincoln and many others involved in tha Civil War, 
slavery was tha one single cause of the conflict. Their 
interpretation assumes that the antebellum Republican party was 
primarily a vehicle for antislavery sentiment. This view, however, 
has been attacked by historians who l.ave emphasized the importance 
of other issues in the formation of the Republican party. John R. 
Commons characterized the Republicans as primarily a homestead 
party, and Charles and Mary Beard later added the tariff as one of 
its fundamental concerns. More recently, historians have stressed 
aversion to the presence of blacks in the western territories as 
the Republicans' motive for opposing the extension of slavery. 
Because the Republicans disavowed the intention of attacking 
slavery in states where it already existed by direct federal 
action, their antislavery declarations have been dismissed by some 
historians as hypocritical.2 William E. Gienapp, while admitting 
that antislavery has a place in the formation of the early party, 
stresses the importance of such issues as temperance and nativism, 
especially at the state level. Michael F. Holt provides a 
variation on the antialavery theme by positing the idea that the 
early Republicans were bothered not so much by slavery itself as 
by the slave power which they viewed as forcing proslavery measures 
on the rest of the country.
Historians have thus varied widely in their views of the
Republican position on black slavery and how central that stand 
was to their appeal. Evidence exists in Republican platforms, 
pamphlets, speeches, and editorials to support widely varying 
interpretations of what the party stood for and why Northerners 
supported it. Some historians, for example, argue that the 
Republicans were abolitionists dedicated to eradicating slavery as 
soon as it was constitutionally feasible, while others insist that 
humanitarian or moral antipathy to the institution, if not outright 
abolitionism, was the moving force behind the party.5 They point 
out that the 1856 Republican national platform condemned slavery 
as a "relic of barbarism" and proclaimed that "all men are created 
equal and have inalienable rights to life, liberty, and the pursuit 
of happiness." Together with other assaults on slavery's 
inhumanity, demands that it be extinguished, and statements 
proclaiming the glory of freedom and liberty, these can provide 
evidence that Republicans sincerely wanted to do away with slavery 
altogether.
Yet along with demands that slavery be ended and freedom 
extended went constant Republican denials that the federal 
government had any right to interfere with slavery within the 
Southern states or that Republicans had any intention of doing so. 
Similarly, along with enlightened talk of the equality of all men 
appeared blatant racism or at least strained arguments that concern 
for the black, free or slave, had nothing to do with the Republican 
party. This evidence seems to refute the assertions that moral 
antipathy to black slavery or humanitarianism was the basic force
behind Republicanism. william H. Seward, a prominent early 
Republican, acknowledged this view when he said, “The motive of 
those who have protested against the extension of slavery [has] 
always been concern for the welfare of the white man, not an 
unnaturalsympathy withthe negro."6
Historians have tried to reconcile these contradictory appeals 
in various ways. Some simply admit that the party was a 
heterogeneous coalition ranging from radicals to conservatives on 
the slavery issue whose rhetoric reflected the diverse views of its 
different elements. Others have excused the Republicans' racist 
remarks as an attempt to defend the party from Democratic charges 
that it oared more about blacks thnn whites. In reality, they 
argue, the Republicans were more favorable to black rights than 
Democrats, as their voting records against discriminatory laws in 
Northern state legislatures demonstrate. still others have 
accepted the racism of some Republicans and the reluctance of the 
vast majority to interfere with slavery in the south by arguing 
that the Republicans were essentially a free-soil party, not an 
abolitionist or antislavery party. Opposition to slavery 
extension, which sprang from a number of sources, constituted the 
party's central thrust. Many sincerely believed that slavery had 
to expand to survive and that restricting it would bring about its 
ultimate destruction. Others wanted to protect the free labor 
system of the North by preserving areas for its expansion, while 
some wanted to keep blacks out of the territories for racist 
reasons. Many Republicans, finally, desired to stop the growth of
Southern political power.
Controvaray ovar the propar place of antialavary in the 
Republican ideology did not, however, begin with hiatoriana. 
During the 1850s, considerable debate occurred within abolitionist 
circles as to the proper attitude they should express toward 
Republicanism. In part, this was simply an extension of the schism 
between political and non-political abolitionists, and it comes as 
no surprise that William Lloyd Garrison and others like him held 
little enthusiasm for the Republicans. Yet many abolitionists who 
had no objection on principle to political involvements considered 
the antislavery commitment of the Republican party insulficient to 
support. Gerrit Smith and William Goodell, two abolitionists who 
had been instrumental in organizing the Liberty party in New York 
State, in 1855 declared that they could not support a party which 
recognized the constitutionality of slavery anywhere in the Union.
yet it is important to remember that despite their criticisms 
of the Republican party, leading abolitionists maintained close 
personal relations with Republican leaders. The evidence strongly 
suggests that with the exception of Garrison and several others, 
most abolitionists voted with the Republican party despite their 
wish that the party adopt a more aggressive antislavery position* 
Indeed, abolitionist societies experienced financial difficulties 
in the late 1850s as former contributors began giving their money 
to the Republicans. Even Gerrit Smith, who insisted he could 
"never vote for any person who recognizes a law for slavery,"
acontributed five hundred dollars to the Fremont campaign.
Th« fact th«t *o many abolitionists aupportad th« Republican 
party is an indication that antislavery formed no small part of the 
Republican ideology. Many historians have concluded, moreover that 
writers like Charles Beard greatly overestimated the importance of 
economic issues in the elections of 1856, 1858, and 1860. Eric 
Foner goes so far as to say "it would have been suicidal for the
Republicans to have put their emphasis on economic policies,
aparticularly the neo-Whiggism described by Beard.M
If one thing is evident after analyzing the various elements 
which made up the party, it is that antislavery was wne of the few 
policies which united all Republican factions. For political 
reasons, if for no other, the Republicans were virtually oblige^ 
to make antislavery the main focus of their political appeal* Such 
Questions as the tariff, xistivism, and race were too divisive to 
be stressed, while the homestead issue could be s$v&hce# for the 
very reason that it was noncontroversial in the North.
What follows is a study of the emergence of three men as early 
leaders in the Republican party. The selection of these three, 
Joshua R. Giddings, Benjamin F. Wade, and Lyman Trumbull, was, of 
course, not arbitrary. Each is intended to represent a separate 
element in the early party, as each had recently abandoned a 
different political organization to join the Republicans. In the 
case of Giddings, it was the short-lived Free Soil party which was 
actually fused with the Republicans. Wade and Trumbull, on the 
other hand, chose to leave the Whigs and the Democrats, 
respectively, in favor of Republicanism. It is hoped that what
will emerge n y  provide evidence for the argument that slavery, 
■era than any othar factor, is what brought the Republican party 
into being. Only slavery could unite l diverse elements as 
conservative Republicans and radicals, ex-Oemocrats, and former 
Whigs. All agreed that slavery was the major issue of the 1850s. 
Hie potency of the slavery controversy, and the way in which it 
subordinated or absorbed all other political questions, was noted
by the anti-Lecompton Democrat from New York, Horace Clarkt
It is not to be controverted that the slavery agitation is not 
at rest. Zt has absorbed and destroyed our national politics. 
It has overrun State politics. It has even invaded our 
municipalities; and now, in some form or other, everywhere 
controls the elections of the people.
And, Clark may have added, slavery had brought about a new 
political party, and a massive realignment of the American party
mystem.
Isif:1-::ss
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Chapter 1
Joshua R. Giddings
Joshua Giddings is perhaps the easiest early Republican to 
associate with antislavery principles. His expression of 
antislavery views was extensive both within the halls of the United 
States House of Representatives and throughout the northern states 
from 1838 to 1859. In the House, Giddings took every occasion to 
expound his philosophy about slavery. He made many tours to 
promote his cause and to fan the flames of antislavery agitation. 
He was also responsible for the portions of the first Republican 
party platform which contained his ideas of equal rights for all 
men. Giddings was, in short, a radical on the slavery question.
It is not a difficult task to find the antislavery influences 
which helped mold Giddings* radical stance. He made his home in 
the Western Reserve area of northeastern Ohio which, by 1835, had 
become one of the strongest areas of antislavery sentiment. Many 
believe that the significant turning point in Giddings* attitude 
toward slavery occurred when the abolitionist Theodore Weld spoke 
in Jefferson, Ohio in 1835. It is probably unfair to say that 
Giddings was converted to the doctrines of the antislavery forces, 
but there is little question that from that point Giddings was 
truly an "antislavery" personage. How much convincing was 
necessary on Weld's part is unknown, but Dumond reported that Weld 
prayed in the office of the attorney, Giddings, until the latter 
was convinced of the "sin of slavery."1 Weld emphasized the idea
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that slavery must be immediately abolished, not reformed or 
compromised. When he toured the Western Reserve he not only 
influenced Giddings but Benjamin F. Wade as well. Wade and 
Gladings were law partners for a time, but their business failed 
and the two men had a falling out.
Giddings was elected to the Twenty-sixth Congress in December, 
1839 as a Whig. The 16th District of Ohio, which he represented, 
was comprised of Ashtabula, Geauga, and Trumbull counties and 
constituted a Whig stronghold. Most of its constituents held the 
same sectional convictions common to the Western Reserve, and early 
in his campaign Giddings saw to it that his supporters knew where 
he stood on the slavery question. During the canvass he replied 
publicly to a query from the Ashtabula County Antislavery Society, 
explaining his views on slavery's political aspects: both slavery 
and the slave trade in Washington D.C. should be brought to an end. 
Congress had the moral duty and legal power to abolish these 
injustices, but the interstate slave trade was not subject to 
congressional controls. Moreover, he maintained that the Fugitive 
Slave Law of 1793, although unfortunate, was constitutional. On 
the question of the "gag rule," which automatically excluded the 
petitions of antislavery Northerners from House consideration, 
Giddings affirmed his position that all citizens had both a "moral 
and legal right" to petition Congress on any subject. To prohibit 
this right was a gross violation of the Constitution.2
Giddings won the election. Had the antislavery forces been 
united into a political faction, he probably would have been one
10
of the first "Abolitionist Party11 men elected. Except for the 
political label, there was not much difference between the Western 
Reserve Whig and the Western Reserve Abolitionist.
However, Giddings was first and foremost a Whig at the time 
of his entry into national politics, and for several years he was 
influenced by his party*s leaders in Congress. Sampson declared 
that he *'was a Whig by intelligence and temperament; accepted the 
Whig policy and exposition of the Constitution save on the question 
of slavery." He goes on to explain Giddings* antislavery stance 
within the whig party.
By 1837 the Whigs of Ashtabula County were not all active 
antislavery men—  quite possibly only a minority of them were 
so classified, but it is certain that most antislavery men 
were Whigs. Not only is a study of the personnel of the two 
organizations a ground for this conclusion but it is 
strengthened by the fact that during the late 1830s and the 
early 1840s Congressman Giddings was nominated by Whig 
conventions and his antislavery efforts in Washington were 
approved by antislavery meetings.3
When Giddings went to Washington, William Slade of Vermont was 
the only other antislavery representative in Congress. John Quincy 
Adams of Massachusetts was a sympathetic member in the House, but 
he was not sent there on the basis of his antislavery sentiments 
as Slade and Giddings had been. These men found themselves quite 
dependent upon Weld*s help. They asked him to come to Washington
11
to lobby on their behalf, which he did roost effectively. He worked 
in Washington during two sessions of Congress and with Joshua 
Leavitt, encouraged this small group of antislavery Whigs to be 
more militant in dealing with the slave power. Leavitt had a great 
influence upon Giddings, advising him to attack slavery directly 
on the floor of Congress.
Giddings wasted little time in following Leavitt's advice. 
On February 13, 1839, Giddings rose to address the House for the 
first time. The subject under discussion was an amendment to the 
District of Columbia appropriations bill, which net aside $30,000 
for a bridge over the east branch of the Potomac River. The issue 
had not the remotest connection with slavery, but Giddings seized 
upon it, for it would allow him to speak of the terrible activities 
he had seen in the District without being cut off by the "gag 
rule." He moved to strike out the amendment and went on to explain 
his reasons.
It would be wasteful, Giddings maintained, to make such an 
appropriation, for soon the government would be moved to a free 
state because of growing Northern hostility to slavery and the 
slave trade. His constituents viewed with "disgust and abhorrence" 
the spectacle of a Congress surrounded by practices usually 
condoned only by "barbarous and uncivilized nations." No liberty- 
loving Northerner would remain content to "continue the seat of 
government in the midst of a magnificent slave mart • • •" where 
high-sounding congressional debates mingled with "the voice of the 
auctioneer pr claiming the sale of human, intelligent beings."4
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Immediately following his address, an influential Whig paper 
in Cleveland advised Giddings1 constituents to order him home at
c
the earliest opportunity. Amid this criticism from his own party 
Giddings felt no less a loyal Whig, for he found it easy to 
reconcile his Whig and antislavery ideologies. Unrestricted 
sectionalism could easily disrupt the party. Giddings knew this 
and did not wish to destroy Whiggery. He was as eager to defeat 
the Democrats and enact the Whig economic program as he was to push 
his antislavery cause forward. The two loyalties were at least 
partially contradictory, but Giddings tried to reconcile them. He 
thought of himself as acting in the best interests of the party by 
becoming an effective antislavery agitator in Congress.
Though many Southern Whigs were no less devoted to the gag 
rule and slavery than the Democrats, Giddings maintained that the 
Democrats, both Northerners and Southerners, were responsible for 
every proslavery measure. Whigs, on the other hand, even 
slaveowning ones, were redeemable. On the gag rule vote, and 
later, when Adams tried to get a hearing for a petition asking for 
the recognition of Haiti, Giddings noted that nearly every Northern 
Democrat voted with the "Southern interest," while a far greater 
number of Northern Whigs took a sectional position.6
Giddings jumped upon this block of Northern Whig votes and 
decided that agitation on his part would best serve the interests 
of the party. Whiggery, he believed, held the potential to become 
antislavery's best agency. Giddings believed that Whig congressmen 
could become dedicated antislavery men, for they were not bound to
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Southern opinion the way Northern Democrats were. Giddings looked 
upon the Northern Whig votes as a potentially powerful antislavery 
base and he hoped to push the Whigs in this direction with his 
agitation in Congress. In this manner he was able to discover 
harmony between antislavery and Whiggery.
As proof of his Whig loyalties, Giddings supported Harrison 
for President in 1840. This was disappointing to the 
Abolitionists, who had nominated their own Liberty Party ticket, 
but Giddings concluded that the election of the Abolitionist ticket 
was futile. On the other hand, the Whigs had the potential of 
becoming a strong antislavery party. No great love, however, 
developed between Giddings and Harrison during Harrison's tenure 
in office.7
The Florida War provided Giddings with another opportunity to 
attack slavery. The speech delivered on February 8, 1841, 
specifically opposed the appropriation of money for the removal of 
Seminole chiefs and warriors from Florida. Giddings bemoaned the 
fact that northern funds had been squandered on the South for the 
past five years while the propriety of this massive expenditure had 
not been demonstrated.8 A certain $5,000 disbursement for the 
army's purchase of bloodhounds, he charged, was not for the purpose 
of tracking down Indians, as had been represented? it was rather 
for the purpose of capturing runaway slaves. Northern freemen were 
now having their pockets picked for the acquisition of bloodhouds 
to cooperate with the army in this disgraceful and disgusting 
method of waging the war.9
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President Harrison had called a special session of Congress 
to meet in May 1841. This session reported a Whig majority, but 
when the caucus selected slaveholder John White of Kentucky to run 
for Speaker, Giddings and a number of antislavery Whigs bolted the 
nomination and voted for Northern Whig candidates. Despite this, 
Giddings was appointed chairman of the Claims Committee. This move 
angered many Southern Congressmen.
During this brief session, Giddings and the rest of the Whigs 
were preoccupied with economic legislation. The antislavery circle 
joined with its Whig brethren to repeal the subtreasury system, 
pass a bankruptcy bill, and create a third Bank of the United 
States.10 Giddings also supported a plan to readopt the 11 gag 
rule," while at the same time asking that a committee investigate 
it in order to "get at [the] business of the Whig economic program, 
for enough time had already been wasted."11 This tactic brought 
the wrath of Joshua Leavitt and other abolitionists upon Giddings. 
Leavitt was incensed at the antislavery Whigs for capitulating to 
the "gag rule," even temporarily.12
Giddings was to redeem himself in the eyes of the 
abolitionists during the Twenty-seventh Congress, for this Congress 
was about to witness a climax in the struggle for free debate. 
Giddings was to be a central figure in that struggle.
The "gag rule" was the central focus of the conflict. This 
rule, product of Southern fears for slavery and Northern desires 
to avoid the sectiohal conflict, had been instituted when 
abolitionists began flooding congress with antislavery materials.
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The "gag" dictated that all petitions to Congress protesting any 
aspect of slavery be automatically tabled without being printed, 
discussed, or acted upon in any manner.
Giddings began meeting with John Quincy Adams, the leader in 
the fight against the Mgag rule,” to map out a plan of attack. The 
two men became close friends and also partners in the congressional 
antislavery struggle. After his first meeting with Adams, Giddings 
doubtless felt more certain than ever that moral duty required him
13to speak out against slavery.
But loyal Whiggery demanded that no Northern member hold undue 
hatred toward slaveholders. Initially Giddings felt none, but he 
began to modify his opinion when the gag rule again passed in mid- 
December. Efforts led by Adams to defeat it were defeated with 
relative ease,*’4 and as debate wore on, Giddings began to notice 
vast differences in the characters of members of the north and 
south. Southern men displayed Hself-important airs” and 
11 overbearing manners,11 while representatives from the North were 
“diffident, taciturn, and forebearing.M Giddings concluded that 
“southern bullies1* had forced everyone else into silence, and no 
one was even willing to protest the slave markets which did 
business across the street from the House of Representatives•15
Trouble began when Giddings introduced the Creole resolutions. 
The Creole was an American ship engaged in the coastal slave trade. 
In 1841, the slaves on board mutinied, killed a seaman, and forced 
the captain to take the vessel to Nassau, where all except the 
murderer were declared free under British law. The American owners
16
denied British jurisdiction over their slave property and demanded 
that the freedmen be returned and tried as murderers.
Giddings, along with Weld, drew up resolutions that argued the 
municipal nature of slavery. According to the municipal theory, 
if slavery1s laws had no effect beyond the borders of the Southern 
states, then once the Creole entered national waters her slaves 
immediately reverted to their God-given state of freedom and were 
right in using violence to throw off their oppressors.
After Giddings introduced these resolutions, confusion 
immediately prevailed. Democrats and Whigs alike were passionately 
aroused by this maneuver. A resolution of censure was drawn up and 
passed, and Giddings was effectively silenced without even 1~eing 
given the opportunity to defend himself. At this point, he 
resigned his office as a representative and left the city for his 
home to begin a re-election bid.
No one was more aware of the high stakes riding on the outcome 
of Giddings1 re-election attempt than the Whigs in Washington. 
Efforts to exonerate Giddings on the floor of the House were 
defeated by Whig votes,3,6 and a move to develop party support fell 
through because of the unwillingness of the Ohio delegation to 
involve itself. The Democrats, of course, stopped at nothing in 
trying to smear the Whigs with abolitionism.
The Reserve voters, meanwhile, with their conservative habits, 
were greatly perturbed by the arbitrary curtailment of Giddings* 
rights as their representative. They returned him to the Capitol 
by a 7469 to 393 majority over his Democratic opponent. ’‘Joshua
Giddings had become an antislavery hero.**
Giddings, armed with the support of his constituency, 
continued the same method which he had used before he was censured 
in the House. On June 3, 1842, while arguing a military bill, he 
brought up the Creole case again. Through the process of his 
censure, re-election, and reassertion of the Creole resolutions, 
Giddings had successfully defied his party and nearly all of
Congress. His 11 reappearance meant the conspiracy against silence
18had been broken. Agitation could proceed apace.'*
The 1843 state and local elections proved disastrous for 
Ohio's Whig party, as the Democrats scored enough victories to 
capture both houses of the legislature as well as the governorship. 
The reason was that the Liberty party had drawn off many 
antislavery Whig voters.
Giddings, however, remained a staunch antislavery Whig, and 
hoped to counter this threat. His answer was a series of essays 
which he signed "Pacificus." They first appeared in the Western 
Reserve Chronicle, a newspaper published in Cleveland. Later they 
appeared in pamphlet form and were copied by various papers. 
"Pacificus" attempted to unite the Whig economic program with 
antislavery doctrine by defining both as parts of larger "Northern 
rights1' which true friends of "the cause" should support. He 
argued that protective tariffs, national roads, and homestead bills 
were as much antislavery measures as the abolition of servitude in 
the District of Columbia.
Giddings hoped to influence two groups with "Pacificus." The
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first was made up of Whigs whose antislavery convictions needed 
prodding* The second was the Liberty Party men who had to be 
persuaded to vote for Whig candidates. Giddings believed that the 
objects of the two parties were very much the same and he hoped to 
unite them. His political logic was, of course, faulty. The more 
he preached to the Liberty men as a Whig the more he antagonized 
his own party. The longer he remained a Whig, the greater became 
Liberty party opposition.
The Texas annexation issue provided Giddings with another 
opportunity to attack slavery. On March 3, 1843, twenty members 
of Congress, including Giddings, united in an address to the people 
of the free states warning that the Southern politicians were 
determined to annex Texas, that their object was to extend and 
perpetuate slavery, that annexation would involve the country in 
a war with Mexico, and that a dissolution of the Union would 
result.3,9
By 1844, the Liberty Party had greatly increased its power 
within the Western Reserve. The Liberty men had increased their 
vote ten times since 1840 and had even established a newspaper in 
Giddings1 district. In the 1844 race, Giddings was attacked as an 
opportunist, and the "Pacificus" arguments were rejected as anti- 
abolitionist nonsense.
Giddings himself, however, remained as solid a Whig as ever. 
Ho longer did he try to reason with the Liberty men. Instead he 
began attacking them furiously as foes of Northern rights, plotters 
who were contriving to place James K. Polk in the presidency and
19
Texas in the Union by drawing votes from the Whig candidate, Henry 
Clay* When the results of the October elections were announced, 
Giddings had defeated his Liberty and Democratic opponents by more 
than a two-to-one margin. His antislavery Whig appeals had done 
their work well.
Upon returning to Congress, Giddings turned his attention to 
his new Whig colleagues, urging them to look into antislavery 
matters. He hoped to organize an antislavery "phalanx" in the 
House capable of driving "slavery into the Atlantic or Gulf of 
Mexico."20
At this point in his Congressional career, Giddings was 
labeled an "Abolitionist" and "Agitator" with neither the 
Democratic party members nor the Whig party members very happy with 
his position. After having served for so long as Chairman of the 
Committee on Claims, he now found himself relegated to the 
Committee on Revolutionary Pensions which had no business to 
consider.
Giddings, however, while radical, was not an abolitionist in 
the truest sense of the word. His antislavery doctrines were far 
too narrow to sustain any federal legislation for complete 
political freedom. His belief in the right of each state to 
regulate its own institutions led him to his program of 
denationalizing slavery but not abolishing it.
Giddings came to believe that the ultimate intention of the 
South was to spread slavery North and destroy civil liberties in 
the free states. In 1843, he observed to Salmon P. Chase that the
principal cause of the slow growth of antislavery politics in the 
North was "ignorance in regard to the encroachments of the Slave 
Power upon our rights.11 Later, he wrote to Chase, saying that he 
was certain 11 that northern liberty or southern slavery must 
fall."21
Especially offensive to Giddings was the idea that Congress 
was pandering to the slave power. At the previous session of 
Congress, he charged, the people's representatives had spent the 
time and money of their constituents to assist slave mongers to 
speculate in human beings, thus contravening the Constitution and 
the rights it guaranteed. No one in the hall, he ventured, would 
risk his reputation by saying that congressmen had the authority 
to appropriate the government's funds for these "base purposes."22
Meanwhile, new elements within the Whig party began acting as 
Giddings felt all good politicians should. In Massachusetts, a 
diverse group of young men, "Conscience" Whigs as they came to be 
called, had taken a strong sectional position by issuing a 
manifesto against the admission of Texas. The leaders of the 
"Conscience" Whigs, soon to be Giddings' closest allies, were one 
day to number among the North's foremost sectional figures. The 
group included such men as Charles Sumner, Charles Francis Adams, 
Henry Wilson, and John Gorham Palfrey.
United in their opposition to Texas annexation, this 
heterogeneous association attacked the "tools of the slave power," 
men like Daniel Webster, Edward Everett, Abbot Lawrence, and one 
whom Giddings had already come to distrust, Robert C. Winthrop.
20
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These individuals represented the Massachusetts orthodoxy# the 
••Cotton” Whigs. The two factions began to compete for control of 
the state organization. The ••Conscience” Whigs helped restore 
Giddings1 dedication to the party at a time when he was coming 
under attack by many of its members.
Tensions increased between the South and North in May 1846 
with the beginning of the Mexican War. On May 12 Giddings took the 
opportunity to speculate on the millions to be spent on the war. 
These huge sums of course# would be drawn largely from the northern 
people# who he said# had a right to know what compensation they 
could expect for their sacrifices. Giddings volunteered the 
information: ••The parasites of the Executive,” the slave drivers 
of the South would gain dazzling fortunes.”23
Giddings# in opposing the Mexican War# was breaking 
significantly with his party. He was one of only fourteen men in 
the House who chose to defy the decision of the Whig caucus and 
vote against the war. His theme in speaking against the war was 
consistent and simple: ”1 will lend the war no aid#” he announced# 
••no support whatever. I will not bathe my hands in the blood of 
the people of Mexico . . .  [in order] to waste her countryside and 
subject her to slavery.”24
Although his attempts to cajole Whiggery into blocking all 
military appropriations were to prove fruitless# Giddings never 
gave up the task. The party# he feared# was heading for 
••inevitable ruin.” He believed the only way to save the Whig party 
was by working for antislavery fusion.
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As early as 1845 Giddings began working for fusion by 
coordinating his efforts in Ohio to capture the Liberty party with 
the movements of the ••Conscience11 Whigs. He had even proposed that 
a national convention be called without party distinction, based 
on a series of gatherings held in various states.
Memories of Henry Clay's defeat in 1844 made most Whigs 
nervous about further fragmentations over the slavery question. 
Giddings and several others, however, informed the Liberty party 
men that they would never again vote for a slaveholder, not even 
Clay, and would bolt to a third party if the Whigs did not nominate 
a Northerner for president in 1848.25
This latest episode brought Giddings to his greatest crisis 
yet as a Whig. Ever since 1838 he had deemed himself a loyal Whig, 
assuming that his sectional agitation was beneficial to the party. 
He could not suddenly cast aside this belief and abandon Whiggery. 
Such a move would have amounted to an admission of failure and 
thus, long after many of his associates had decided to bolt, 
Giddings remained determined to reform the Whig party. He still 
looked forward to dividing the Democrats along sectional lines and 
absorbing the entire North into the Whig party. He would continue 
to feel this way until the national convention finally nominated 
Zachary Taylor.
The plain fact was, however, that the Whig party had no 
candidate whom Giddings could accept. Every report from out of 
state indicated Taylor's growing popularity.
Meanwhile, the Thirtieth Congress was to be evenly divided,
and a balance of power was available to anyone prepared to seize 
it. The contest for speaker of the House promised to be a close 
one, a fact quickly noticed by Giddings and his Massachusetts 
comrades. Giddings responded by trying to solidify backing for the 
strongly anti-war Caleb B. Smith. But soon it became obvious that 
Robert C. Winthrop, Giddings' least favorite "doughface," was 
winning the partyfs endorsement.
Giddings and several other "Conscience" Whigs drew up a list 
of demands which were presented to Winthrop in December. Among 
these demands was a promise from winthrop to organize House 
committees to help bring an end to the war, report bills to abolish 
slavery in the District of Columbia, repeal the 1793 fugitive slave 
law, and obstruct the extension of slavery, winthrop refused even 
to bargain with the bolters.
winthtop did indeed win the Whig nomination, with Giddings and 
his allies ^ieseftting. For this, he was attacked by his own 
party.26 But Giddings would not be discouraged yet. He still 
believed that the party could be saved by a moral crisis and he 
hoped to bring this about. He hurled proslavery accusations at 
Winthrop, forcing Northern Whiggery to take a stand on the issue. 
By late January, the Whigs in Ohio and Massachusetts were dividing 
into two hostile camps.
Giddings attempted to defend himself from the accusations of 
his detractors by writing articles in his own defense for those 
Whig papers that would print them. He imagined himself 
coordinating a struggle for control of the party, but really his
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actions were more effective in solidifying the antislavery Whigs
of Ohio and Massachusetts in favor of third party fusion with the
27Liberty party.
Giddings hoped to unify antislavery opinion behind his own 
presidential favorite, Thomas Corwin, a moderate Whig senator from 
Ohio whose speeches against the Mexican War had impressed many 
antislavery men. Corwin, however, proved unreceptive. He made 
clear to Giddings his opposition to any effort to tun him for 
president, saying that the Whig party would split oh section*# 
issues if the agitation continued.
Giddings, howevep, made clear his intention to oppose Taylor 
at any cost. before the session ended he gave one more significant 
speech on tb# MeKieah War* Taking the opportunity to speak when 
the bill to supply deficiency of appropriations for 1847 was being 
dt*cW sed, 111 l|(btifisd that a portion of the Whig party would not 
suppr - Taylor.
Earlier* he spoke for an hour on the latest military 
Impropriations bill. This speech represented a dSBpepite effort 
py Qiddings to salvage pappy, Tha h® opose was tP
frighten tb& ^Hige by tppppa&tlhd massive Northern defectinPS 
unless the patty doseitM fdylor.
Gi'iaipp ptedihbM that tiiS bbi|| NtptS Was dark indead,
unless tb» b^ bty ceased to voti fop wat tuptf* 4H| p*vat
elicted S Speaker wbd supported pptitmn aggtsssibtt Spri tHB ildVi 
trades while promoting the payment of slave claims. If the party 
refused to enact total divorce of the federal government from
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slavery and unless it denounced Taylor as Mone whose hands are 
dripping with human gore,*' the Barnburners, or anti-Southern 
Democratic faction, antislavery Whigs, and Liberty men would be 
forced to band together in an independent effort. The coalition
he warned with deadly accuracy, would form "the germ of a party
28which will at no distant day, become dominant in this nation."
Having for so long written off the antislavery Whigs as 
opportunists, many Liberty men simply had not believed that 
Giddings and the rest would bolt if Taylor got the nomination. But 
such Liberty leaders began changing their minds as they watched 
Giddings defy his party on the speakership and battle for abolition 
ef slavery in the District of Columbia. While Giddings' struggle 
with Winthrop continued to make ever ..tore permanent divisions among 
thf northern Whigs, his activities were also causing an important 
•WttMlnt ef Liberty party opinion to reevaluate its position. Many 
third party men soon expressed a far more favorable attitude toward 
Union with the dissident antislavery groups within the two major 
parties.
Giddings himself, meanwhile, remained sure that the Whig# 
a m l 4  to kept together "only in one way; that is to gat up the 
fW— f l f  of slavery in every possible -.hope and thereby {to] compel 
northern ttbige and southern whiga to take their position.*11
I* Neeoh, tha Boston Atlas vindicated Giddings fay publishing 
ppos^f oupgio r t log hit aoouaations against winthrop. This reopened 
the entire controversy. The n ewspapers of Boston a .id Maine assumed 
their previous position, and the bitter rejoinders lasted for a
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month. By this time the party had completely polarized. Whigs in 
the Reserve were ready, if necessary, to follow Giddings and the 
Massachusetts minority into a third party.
But Giddings still believed that bolting would be unnecessary. 
Early in the session, he met with Supreme Court Justice John 
McLean, an Ohioan of high stature in the Whig party, and had come 
away much impressed with the Justice's views on slavery. Giddings 
now felt certain that McLean was the most promising candidate, and 
that if he were nominated he could easily draw the radical 
Democrats and Liberty men into the Whig party.
The results of the 1848 presidential race, however, were 
anything but pleasing to antislavery men. The Democrats nominated 
Lewis Cass on a platform of "popular sovereignty." This doctrine 
opened to possible slavery all lands taken from Mexico by the 
recently ratified Treaty of Guada1upe-Hida 1 go. The Whigs served 
antislavery men no better. On the fourth ballot General Taylor, 
despite his total lack of political experience, was nominated. 
Henry Wilson led the antislavery Whigs out the door.
Salmon Chase issued a call for a nonpartisan state convention 
in Columbus, and the Barnburners put forth an announcement of a 
bolters' meeting in Utica. The Massachusetts "Conscience" Whigs 
proclaimed that a similar meeting would convene in Worcester, and 
Gamaliel Bailey advised all Liberty men to take part in these 
various deliberations. Giddings announced that no "true" Whig 
could support Taylor, and left to help his Massachusetts friends.
On June 28 the Worcester meeting began. Five thousand
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delegates attended as Giddings, Henry Wilson, Charles Allen, and 
Charles Sumner sat at the speakers* table. A resolution endorsing 
Giddings* actions in Congress was the first agenda item, and it 
passed unanimously. The delegates rejected Taylor and Cass and 
adopted resolutions calling for a national convention to meet in 
Buffalo on August 9.
The full significance of Giddings* endless wars with the 
••Cotton11 Whigs had finally been revealed. Antislavery Whigs were 
completely aroused, ar.J large portions of the Liberty party were 
now more friendly toward fusion because Giddings gave it his 
approval* In the six months since he had chosen not to vote for 
Robert Winthrop, he had tried his best to save the Whigs from the 
"slave power.M MBut because of his activities, no man had done 
more, albeit unwittingly, to galvanize the third party movement 
than had Joshua Giddings.1,30
At the Free Soil convention held in Buffalo on August 8, 
Martin Van Buren was nominated for president. The platform pledged 
"free soil" as the means for restricting slavery. This stand was 
too conservative for certain Liberty party leaders, including 
Gerrit Smith and William Goodell, who left the Buffalo convention.
But for Giddings the Free Soil party represented an axtvance, 
not a retreat. Unlike other antislavery Whigs such as Horace 
Greeley or Ben Wade, Giddings had finally chosen to cut all ties 
with his old party. The Whig party, he believed, had ceased to be 
representative of the people of the North and of the people who saw 
the evil and the wrong of slavery. Despite the somewhat
conservative nature of its proceedings, the Free Soil doctrines did 
far less violence to Giddings* beliefs than they did to those of 
the Liberty men. Furthermore, he was to defend a radical 
interpretation of this platform in the same manner that he had 
always proclaimed the Whig party to be an antislavery party.
Giddings now began an exhaustive campaign, this time as a Free 
Soil candidate. He campaigned on the assertion that the Whig party 
had abandoned its "true principles” by nominating Taylor. Orthodox 
constitutionalism, he claimed, now resided exclusively in the 
doctrines of the Free Soilers. He was of course, attacked by the 
Whigs endlessly. The results, however, vindicated Giddings once 
again. He carried every county in his district and defeated his 
coalition opponent by over 3,000 votes.
Giddings now pursued his antislavery goals as a Free Seller, 
the turn of events had given him increased confidence. There was 
strength in numbers and even though the antislavery forces were not 
in the majority, the chance of success was gaining momentum. In 
December he introduced a bill authorizing the people of the 
District of Columbia to express themselves on the question of 
slavery. His objective was to place before the country the fact 
that both the Whig and Democratic parties were committed to the 
support of slavery and the slave trade in the District. This was
accomplished.
Almost immediately Giddings learned that his view of the Free 
Soil party was a long way from that of most of the party members. 
To Chase and many others the party was simply a temporary device
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for political gain. Since 1848 David Wilmot, Preston King, and 
others of the ex-Democratic faction had agreed with this position. 
Giddings1 need to feel politically loyal, however, remained. 
Politics to him still consisted of appealing to the national 
conscience.
When Chase approached him with a plan to merge with the 
Democrats, therefore, Giddings refused to listen. He insisted that 
the party should act as a permanent, independent institution. 
Fusion, he feared, would destroy the organization's identity and 
rob it of its distinctive moral power. Giddings much preferred a 
policy of keeping the Free Soilers aloof from all Whig and 
Democratic squabbles.
By mid-July, however, when nominations for off-year elections 
were made, nearly every county in Ohio had a Free soil platform 
which favored fusion with the Democrats. Even the party's name was 
changed, with "Free Democracy" being substituted for "Free Soil." 
Although he scarcely sensed it, Giddings was already being left 
behind by many politicians within the antislavery movement.
The 1850 elections in Ohio announced the ruin of the Free 
Soilers as an independent reform movement. Everywhere in the 
state, Free Soil men were merging into the Democratic party/ 
Giddings alone succeeded as an independent representative.
In mid-February, Henry Clay delivered a speech against a mob 
of Boston abolitionists which had rescued a runaway named Shadrach 
from the custody of federal marshals, commissioned under the 
Fugitive Slave Law.3* Giddings, in turn, castigated Clay's bad
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taste on the floor of the House, The rescuers, Giddings 
maintained, were defying tyranny, just as the Sons of Liberty had 
done at the Boston Tea Party. As incidents like the Shadrach case 
became increasingly frequent after 1851, Giddings continued to 
channel their impact into the. halls of Congress. These verbal 
exercises were part of Giddings* effort to rebuild the Free Soil 
party.
The major thrust of his effort, however, was a series of 
conventions. At the first, Giddings brought forth a platform which 
pledged the party to every imaginable antislavery measure and it 
was adopted unanimously. The entire Compromise of 1850 was 
repealed in favor of complete denationalization of slavery. Any 
Whigs and Democrats with acceptable antislavery principles would 
be welcomed into the organization, but the third party itself would 
never bow to the older organizations. Finally, all agreed with 
Giddings motions to schedule a state nominating convention in 
Columbus for August 21 and a national convention to meet in 
Cleveland to prepare for the 1852 campaign.
In June the Whig and Democratic presidential conventions 
convinced Giddings that a third party was necessary. The Democrats 
drafted Franklin Pierce, whom Giddings despised, and the Milqs 
chose Winfield Scott. loth parties* platforms upheld the 
Compromise measures and promised not to renew agitation over the 
slavery question.
Giddings was now determined to launch the Free Soil campaign. 
On the floor of the House he assailed the Whigs and Democrats for
jointly supporting the Compromise, especially the Fugitive Slave 
Act. "The Free Soilers," he promised, "would dwell on the question 
of slavery until the people reacted en masse to hurl from power the
3 2men who thus condemn popular feeling."
The National Free Soil Convention opened on August 11, 1852, 
in Pittsburgh. Giddings1 influence was immediately apparent. 
Ohio's delegates carried a banner proclaiming "No Compromise with 
Slaveholders of Doughfaces." Giddings, as chairman of the platform 
committee, reported resolutions which denounced the Compromise, 
endorsed a complete denationalization of slavery, and called for 
the recognition of Haiti as the first step toward "moral 
intervention" in foreign affairs.
Back in Ohio, no one was betting on Giddings to succeed 
himself, for his district had been drastically gerrymandered. 
Cuyahoga, Lake, and Geauga counties, in which he had always polled 
majorities, had been replaced with two counties, one of which had 
gone consistently Democratic since the 1830s. Yet Giddings 
surprised many by carrying his new district.
In the national contest, however, Franklin Pierce scored an 
unparalleled victory. Scott controlled just forty-two electoral 
votes, while John P. Hale, the Free Soil candidate, pulled in about 
half of Van Suren's 1848 figure. Whiggery was slowly expiring, and 
the Free Soil party simply had not become the rallying point that 
Giddings had hoped for.
In December, 1853, antislavery issues, it seemed, were 
effectively buried, and the number of congressional agitators was
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greatly diminished. Charles Durkee, Charles Allen, and George W. 
Julian had all failed to obtain re-election in 1852. The political 
atmosphere was quiet and undisturbed by sectional turbulence.
The Free Soil issue, however, was about to explode. In early 
January, 1854, Stephen A. Douglas announced his intention to repeal 
the Missouri Compromise and open Kansas and Nebraska to slavery. 
In theory at least, slavery would have vast new areas for 
expansion.
By January 22, Giddings, Charles Sumner, and Salmon Chase had 
finished composing an "Appeal of the Independent Democrats in 
Congress to the people of the United States,11 designed to mobilize 
the North against the sudden incursion of the Mslave power." The 
"Appeal1' indicted the Kansas-Nebraska Act as a "gross violation of 
a sacred pledge," which would convert free territory "into a dreary 
despotism inhabited by masters and slaves."33 The impact of the 
"Appeal" upon Northern attitudes was tremendous. Some have gone 
so far as to say that "it became the significant basis for the 
beginning of the Republican party."34
In the House and Senate the Whig party totally dissolved, its 
Northern branch uniting with the Free Soilers against the Kansas- 
Nebraska Act. A splinter group of Democrats, meanwhile, also chose 
to place sectional loyalty over party allegiance. Northern 
politics now began a transformation from which the Republican party 
was finally to emerge.
In Ohio, a complicated series of conventions which paralleled 
these in other states had already prepared the way for a massive
free soil fusion attempt. This attempt was begun in a very 
conservative manner. A state wide non-partisan meeting held in 
Columbus during mid-March set the tone of the movement. 
Participants approved resolutions condemning the Kansas-Nebraska 
Act and endorsed the Compromise of 1850, the Fugitive Slave Law and 
all, as the "final solution" to the sectional quarrels.
Many radicals were incensed by the conservative nature of the 
resolutions but Giddings threw himself into the spreading 
coalition. As he had done in the Whig and Free Soil parties, 
Giddings hoped to push the emerging group to a more radical stance 
and use it as a vehicle for antislavery agitation.
On July 13, the anti-Nebraska nominating convention assembled 
in Columbus. The delegates nominated a complete slate of 
candidates, endorsed the idea of a national convention, and again 
assured the public that the Compromise of 1850 offered the best 
solution to the slavery question. It took five ballots to secure 
Giddings1 renomination. On the final vote he barely scraped by, 
43-40, and the closeness of the contest was an indication of his 
tenuous place in the emerging party. The conservative faction had 
nearly muscled Giddings out of the party just as it was forming.
With the nomination behind him, Giddings1 re-election was a 
certainty. By October the voters had rejected the democrats in all 
Northern states except Illinois. Every district in Ohio elected 
a fusion!st candidate for Congress and the anti-Kansas-Nebraska 
nominees for state offices secured 75,000 vote majorities.
The future of the fusion attempt was by no means assured,
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however* The year 1855 witnessed the rise of an ominous new party, 
the Know-Nothings, which threatened to eclipse the anti-Kansas- 
Nebraska movement. The Know-Nothings touched America*s deep streak 
of anti-immigrant and anti-Catholie bigotry and attracted many 
followers as it provided an outlet for intolerance while acting as 
a home for displaced conservative Whigs. Though the party had been 
completely overshadowed by the free soil upheaval in 1854, by 1855 
it was starting to draw a statewide following. Giddings and many 
others began to fear for the future of their fragile fusion group. 
Some hoped for fusion with the Nativists, but Giddings advocated
- J  c
no cooperation save on the principles of liberty. **
With the pivotal 1855 Ohio gubernatorial race looming, 
Giddings and other radicals like Chase began to insist that slavery 
be ,,the issue and the sole issue*' of 1855. Salmon Chase had long 
been considered the roost acceptable choice for governor. The Know- 
Nothings announced that they were planning a state nominating 
convention of their own only two weeks before the anti-Nebraska men 
were due to assemble in Columbus for the same purpose. Their 
intention, of course, was to coerce the fusionists by endorsing 
Chase first.
Giddings began taking steps to prevent any such coercion, 
first, he announced his support for Chase, then he planned a 
simple, effective strategy. He knew that the Know Nothings had 
begun to split on sectional lines over the Kansas-Nebraska 
question, and he was certain that the best policy was to emphasize 
this split, Fusionists, he decided, must stand firm upon their
doctrines, refusing to compromise upon the slavery question, 
Giddings also told Chase that he planned to bolt the Columbus 
convention if even the slightest bargain was made with the 
nativists. MHe made clear that there was already too little 
humanitarianism in the a nt i-Ka ns a s-Neb ra ska organization and that 
he did not intend to let it be diluted further with bigoted "Know- 
Nothing ism .1,36
Soon, radical and moderate anti-Kansas-Nebraska presses all 
over the state began to echo Giddings* theme. At the nativist 
convention on June 20, the Know-Nothings, intimidated and unsure 
of themselves, vetoed independent nominations, adopted a strong 
anti-Kansas-Nebraska platform, and made clear their desire to work 
closely with the Columbus meeting. So far, Giddings* tactics had 
worked quite well.
His predictions, however, were only partly accurate, for the 
Columbus convention was certainly not all he had hoped for, even 
though concessions to the nativists were held to a minimum. Chase 
received a unanimous nomination for governor, and the rest of the 
slate was filled with conservative fusionists acceptable to the 
Know-Nothings. Most of the nativists were now completely fused 
with the Free Soil political machine, and all factions within the 
anti-Nebraska fold were partly mollified. Ohio*s Republican party 
had finally come into being.
Giddings was, perhaps, the least satisfied delegate at the 
convention. The resol* tions merely condemned the Kansas-Nebraska 
Act, insisted on free soil, and endorsed the idea of a Republican
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presidential convention to meet the following year. It was the 
most restricted antislavery program yet put forward in Ohio. 
Giddings seized the floor and announced that, although he would not 
object to the resolutions, they certainly did not go far enough. 
In the platform committee meeting he had pressed for a statement 
asserting the duty of the federal government to protect man's God- 
given right to human freedom. The others had overruled him, but 
he still wished to make his position clear. In the moment of 
decision, Giddings failed to make good his threat of bolting. 
Instead he acquiesced to the will of the delegates, overlooked the 
resolutions, and assumed that he could best improve Republicanism 
by remaining associated with it. This choice was in keeping with 
the precedents he had set for himself as a member of the Whig and 
Free Soil parties. Giddings next offered a resolution calling on 
ail members of the convention to vow perpetual allegiance to 
Republican creeds and never to return to their old parties. He was 
voted down. While Giddings had worked hard to keep the Republicans 
from falling prey to nativism, his services were far less 
recognized by his colleagues than his antislavery radicalism, which 
was placing him beyond the pale of party regulars.37
This was to be a characteristic of Giddings' sojourn in the 
Republican party. By 1858, he was rebuked and failed to be 
renominated. He was, in all likelihood, too radical for his new 
party. His nervous Republican colleagues tried their best to keep 
him quiet. They feared, with good reason, that he was not the 
proper man to argue the moderate nature of the party. In the
Thirty-fourth Congress, Ohio Republican John Sherman tried to rebut 
the Southern charges of abolitionism. He did so by making a 
detailed analysis of the antislavery movement. There were two 
types of antislavery men with whom the Republicans had nothing to 
do, Sherman explained, Garrisonian abolitionists and slightly less 
"ultra*1 men like Joshua Giddings. Giddings* opinions, said Sherman 
reassuringly, were "no more engrafted upon the Republican platform 
than the recent doctrines of Governor Adams of South Carolina in 
reopening the slave trade." To be sure, Republicans regarded the 
venerable agitator with "great respect" but hardly considered him
*» Q
a legitimate member of the party.
To some antislavery partisans like William Lloyd Garrison all 
attempts to reform the political system from within amounted to 
morally debilitating compromises, only forestalling the day of 
emancipation. Joshua Giddings, however, had spent his years in 
Congress trying to achieve what Garrison deemed impossible, a 
fusion of morality and conventional politics in order to reform 
society. Giddings was convinced that by moral agitation he could 
persuade his fellow representatives to act, and he refused to be 
deterred by the compromising actions of his associates.
Despite all the pragmatism of his position, Giddings had 
spoken out courageously in the House of Representatives from 1838 
to 1858, in an effort to mobilize American politics against the 
Southern labor system. By assuming the role of Congress* moral 
catalyst, Joshua Giddings enjoyed a successful career as a 
practitioner of radical politics, transmitting the moral
37
perceptions of revolutionaries like Garrison to the 
institutionalized politicians of ante-bellum America, He provided 
a vital link between traditional representative government and the 
Moral activist.
This link, however# was one the early Republican party wished 
to avoid. The party was, after all, struggling to gain respect in 
its early days and the lant thing it needed was to be associated 
with radical abolitionist thought. The Republicans were a diverse 
assortment of individuals representing a range of thought, even on 
the slavery question. It took the Kansas-Nebraska Act, and its 
implications of slavery and "slave power*' extension to bring the 
various elements together. On the issue of slavery extension and 
Kansas-Nebraska the Republicans were united. On other issues such 
as the Fugitive Slave Law and black rights, they were much less 
cohesive. Talk such as that bantered about by Giddings during his 
tenure in the House was bound to step on toes and disturb many 
party members.
Eased upon this evidence, one would certainly not be incorrect 
in asserting that Giddings was not representative of the "typical** 
early Republican. It is important to remember though, that the 
early party was an odd collection of many different factions. 
Trying to pinpoint the "typical" 1855 Republican would be a little 
like trying to locate the "typical" American from any period. The 
fact is that Joshua Giddings is an important representative of one 
of the factions, albeit a very radical one, which was fused into 
the Republican party. His own case gives one no reason to doubt
his own belief that “there is but one real issue between the 
Republican party and those factions that stand opposed to it. That 
is the question of slavery.
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Chapter 2 
Benjamin F. Wade
At first glance, the careers of Benjamin Wade and Joshua 
Giddings seem almost identical. They were both, after all, Ohio 
radicals who became famous fighting slavery. There are, however, 
important differences which justify their inclusion in this study. 
Perhaps most interesting is the fact that Wade and Giddings, 
especially later in their careers, really did not get along in 
spite of the fact that they seemed to be working toward the same 
goals.
The name of Benjamin Wade is linked inextricably with 
radicalism. No matter what the consequences, Wade could be relied 
upon to support radical causes, and when he championed them, he did 
so with such vigor and bluntness that he became known as "Bluff” 
Benjamin Wade.
The principal reform in which Wade became interested concerned 
the Negro—  first emancipation from slavery, then elevation to full 
citizenship. Along with Giddings, Wade was one of the few men to 
speak out in favor of black suffrage. If the Republican voters 
wanted strong talk from their representatives, Wade did his best 
to satisfy them. He was the master of what one reporter called 
"scorching sarcasms." When it seemed that the Senate was more 
interested in discussing the acquisition of Cuba than the homestead 
bill, Wade told the southerners, "The question will be, shall we 
give niggers to the nigger less, or land to the landless?" And
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after a slaveholding Senator described with tenderness his 
relationship with an old house servant, Wade retorted, ♦•nobody 
wished to forbid his taking his old mammy with him—  we only sought 
to forbid his selling her after he got there.” Wade was, indeed, 
biting and vehement when it came to slavery questions.
Wade grew up in the Western Reserve in poverty with little 
formal education. Once he became old enough he studied law under 
Elisha Whittlesey, as had Giddings. By 1831, the law firm of Wade 
and Giddings had been formed.
During the first few years of their association the two men 
found each other congenial. They were generally in agreement about 
politics and law and tended to complement each other as partners. 
As an accomplished speaker, Giddings would appear in court and do 
the pleading. As an excellent researcher, Wade would stay in the 
office and do the background work. As time went on the firm 
prospered. Success helped Wade overcome his early timiditv and 
eventually he was able to make forceful appearances in c o l . 
Within a few years, both Giddings and Wade had made such names for 
themselves that the firm became known as one of the most important 
on the Reserve, with business extending all over Ashtabula, 
Trumbull, and Geauga counties.
When the panic of 1837 broke however, the firm of Giddings and 
Wade was faced with financial disaster and the old partnership was 
dissolved. Giddings ran for Congress while Wade ran for the state 
senate and formed a new partnership with Rufus P. Ranney. Both 
Giddings and Wade eventually succeeded in extricating themselves
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from heavy indebtedness, but the former partners gradually drifted 
apart and finally became bitter enemies.
It was almost inevitable that Wade should have been attracted 
to politics and to the Whig party. Joshua Giddings had long been 
active in the anti-Jacksonian party in Ohio, and Elisha Whittlesey, 
the mentor of both Giddings and Wade, represented amti-Jacksonian 
sentiment in the lower house of Congress. The overwhelming 
majority of the professional men on the Reserve were opposed to the 
Jackson administration. Just as their forebears in New England had 
been Federalist, just as they themselves had supported John Quincy 
Adams and Henry Clay as National Republicans, so they now joined 
the new Whig party, winninc irtually every election in the area
iuntil 1846. Wade remained a aunch Whig until the demise of the 
party in 1854.
As a Whig, Wade was strongly opposed to what was described as 
••executive usurpation,•• standing instead for a weak Presidency. 
When it came to the various economic tendencies of Whiggery, 
however, he was not always a strict party man. To be sure, he 
believed in a protective tariff and internal improvements at 
federal expense, but in the matter of subsidies to industry and 
government solicitude for corporations, he found himself more often 
than not in company with the hated Democrats. Moreover, he 
couldn^t forget the underprivileged and if his own party opposed 
such beneficial measures as the abolition of imprisonment for debt, 
he had no problems with joining the opposition.
One of his main reasons for remaining within the party was
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practicality. Third party movements seemed harmful to him, and so 
he shied away from the various antislavery parties, Liberty or Free 
Soil, which were becoming popular on the Western Reserve. For him, 
his own major party was the proper vehicle for political action. 
Nevertheless, he never understood that working within a party meant 
blind fidelity to the party line. When his party's policies suited 
him, he supported them. When they did not, he never had any 
compunctions about asserting his independence.
In the fall of 1837 he was elected to the Ohio senate by the 
Whigs. He was then 37 years old. The state was at the time 
largely Democratic. Though one of the youngest members, he was at 
once placed on the judiciary committee, then the most important 
committee of the senate.
Many believe that Wade, like Giddings, became profoundly 
interested in the antislavery movement because of the speeches of 
Theodore Weld, the great abolitionist orator, who spoke on the 
Reserve in 1837.2 There is probably, however, no reason to doubt 
that Wade never had any use for an institution so much at variance 
with everything he was used to. Weld may have strengthened some 
convictions which Wade already held, but he scarcely could have 
done wore. Wade most likely came by his antislavery sentiments 
naturally.
Whatever the source of his antislavery feelings, there could 
be no doubt about their intensity. Within two short years of his 
appearance in the state senate he had succeeded in becoming known 
as one of his region's most outspoken champions of the rights of
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blacks. He had hardly taken his seat in Columbus when the question 
of repealing the state's Black Codes was raised. As the law then 
stoodi blacks could neither vote nor attend the public schools in 
Ohio. They were excluded from all juries and their testimony was 
not acceptable in cases involving whites. Opponents of the Codes, 
though still in a small minority, were not idle. Almost from the 
day on which Wade first entered the senate, antislavery senators 
presented petitions for their repeal. Wade, who was strongly in 
favor the cause of equal rights for blacks, soon presented 
petitions for repeal himself. Although he could not induce the 
legislature to take action in 1838, he was beginning to make his 
mark as an advocate of black equality.
Even while the petitions concerning the Black Codes were being 
presented, the slavery issue itself came up in the legislature. 
The question of the propriety of the annexation of Texas was 
beginning to divide the nation. Wade was put on a committee to 
consider the subject, on January 11, 1838, he rendered his report, 
saying that the proposed annexation was neither expedient nor 
constitutional. Since its object was to spread slavery, he 
denounced it as utterly opposed to the principles of the 
declaration of Independence. 11 It is madness to tempt destruction 
hy extending this rotten and wicked system over what are now 
unpeopled solitudes," he wrote, asserting that to take foreign 
territories for such purposes would brand the United States as 
hypocritical in the eyes of the world.3
For many of the lawmakers, Whig and Democratic alike, the
report was much too outspoken. Wade soon realized that the senate 
would adopt anti-Texas resolutions only if they were watered down* 
In his usual practical manner, he withdrew his report and submitted 
new resolutions, more acceptable to the majority because they 
referred only indirectly to slavery. These passed with only one 
dissenting vote. And although his original report was not accepted 
by the legislature, it was reprinted in pamphlet form, so that the 
whole state could familiarize itself with the senator's antislavery 
views.4
The Texas committee was only the first select committee upon 
which Wade served in the antislavery cause. In January, 1838, he 
presented petitions from his constituents protesting against the 
"gag rule" adopted by the national House of Representatives. Wade 
believed that the rule requiring all antislavery petitions to be 
tabled without discussion was an outrage, and he protested strongly 
against efforts to sidetrack his petitions.
When the legislature assembled again in December, 1838, the 
Whig majority had vanished. The Democrats outnumbered their 
opponents by a narrow margin, and since they were more friendly to 
slavery than the Whigs, Wade could expect little sympathy for his 
antislavery notions. Wade blamed the Whigs' defeat on 
abolitionists who had bolted the party. "Ho doubt the Whigs lost 
the State this year through the influence of the Abolitionists," 
he wrote. "X hope they will learn before it is too late that they 
have lent themselves to a party who are devoted soul and body to 
Southern dictation."5 He had no use for third party organizations,
but this did not mean that he had changed his mind on slavery. On 
the contrary, Mhis stand must have satisfied all but the most 
extreme among the foes of human bondage.”
Wade’s attacks on the ’’peculiar institution” made him famous, 
and before long he was singled out by people all over the state to 
present antislavery and anti-Black Code petitions to the Senate. 
Not only abolitionists, but also blacks became aware of the 
outspoken senator. Though they were disenfranchised and 
persecuted, they had hopes of bettering their lot. Since they were 
excluded from the common schools, they sought a charter to 
incorporate a school of their own. To present a petition for this 
purpose, they selected Wade. The Democratic majority was furious.
The controversy that really stamped Wade as an outstanding 
antislavery legislator in Ohio was the struggle over the Ohio 
Fugitive Slave Law. The proposed law provided for the return of 
fugitives upon simple application to an Ohio judge or mayor by the 
alleged owner. Wade and three fellow Whigs attacked it 
persistently. Despite this, the bill passed.
On issues other than slavery, especially his interest in the 
poor, Wade also showed his independence. Strongly in favor of 
abolition of imprisonment for debt, a reform generally opposed by 
Whigs, he must have known that any outspoken opposition to the 
party on this issue would make him unpopular with the businessmen 
at home, who might displace him in the fall of 1839. To keep quiet 
would have been easy, but it was not his way of doing things. 
Whether because of his innate belief in progress or of his humble
origins, he was determined to support a bill to abolish the 
degrading practice, and to the horror of his associates, he carried 
out his purpose. When a Democratic bill for abolition of 
imprisonment for debt was enacted into law against the wishes of 
the majority of Whigs in 1838, it was firmly supported by Wade.
For a man who believed as strongly in the rights of the 
individual as Wade, his party's support of corporations was equally 
disturbing. His belief in the equality of man went hand in hand 
with a distrust of corporations, although a good Whig was expected 
to stand by these institutions against attacks from the opposition. 
Orthodox party members were appalled when, early in 1838, the 
senator introduced an anti-corporation measure. He was unable to 
have the bill adopted, but, when he returned to Columbus in 
December, he tried again. The Whigs remained unconvinced. Yet it 
was a popular measure, and within two years a similar bill would 
be passed with only six representatives opposing it in the House. 
While Wade's stand hadn't made him popular with his party, "it had 
proved his foresight and independence."7
Wade's distrust of corporations was not confined merely to 
advocacy of a greater separation between government and business. 
It extended much further, to the amazement of his Whig colleagues, 
to the concept of limited liability itself. His old-fashioned view 
made him wary of incorporated businesses, and when the Democrats 
proposed to make individual stockholders responsible for the debts 
of corporations, he not only voted with them, but on several 
occasions himself offered restrictive amendments to bills
chartering corporations. His interest in popular rights did not 
permit him to support a cause which he believed to be dangerous, 
and if his party associates didn't agree with him, he saw no reason 
why he shouldn't assert his independence.
Wade's interest in popular rights also caused him to work for 
the extension of free education for all. Ohio had had a public 
school system since 1821, but the principle of free public 
education hadn't been generally accepted. The legislature, in 
February, 1838, passed a school bill which furthered the cause of 
free education for all citizens by appropriating a common school 
fund of $200,000 financed by a tax on the counties. Governor 
Vance, a Whig, endorsed the reform, and Wade, this time in harmony 
with his party, not only supported the measure, but defended it 
vehemently in the following years against attempts to repeal it.
As the school question showed, Wade's independence and 
devotion to radical causes didn't mean that he didn't consider 
himself a good Whig. Never one to desert a party because of 
differences of opinion, he was thrilled by the victory of Ohio's 
anti-Jacksonian party in 18 37 and he supported most of their 
measures when he first arrived in Columbus. The Democrats seemed 
to him an unprincipled group of politicians who pandered to 
slaveholders, and he expected to accomplish great things with a 
Whig majority in the legislature.
The Whigs' national problems interested him also. He begged 
his old mentor Elisha Whittlesey not to resign his seat in the 
House; he supported a resolution condemning President Martin Van
Buren's proposed independent treasury system, and he voted to 
castigate John C. Calhoun's distribution scheme.8 In spite of his 
radicalism, Wade felt at home in the Whig party, but to orthodox 
party members his deviations from party discipline were cause for 
concern.
Conservative Whigs on the Reserve disliked Wade's strong 
independence. They were afraid of abolitionism. They strongly 
believed in government subsidies to corporations, and they 
considered the concept of limited liability essential for a sound 
business structure. As a result, many came out against Wade in 
1839, and on election day they rejected him by 72 votes.9
Wade now began a very temporary retirement from political 
activity. In the first year after his defeat, he didn't run for 
office. But the issues at stake were too stirring for Wade to sit 
by quietly. The Whigs had nominated William Henry Harrison for 
president, and the campaign fascinated Wade. Identifying the Whig 
cause with his own, he threw himself into the campaign with full 
force. His service to the party was rewarded with a renomination 
for the state senate the next year. Again he delivered speeches 
all over the district, and when the returns were in, he had a 
majority of more than 1000 votes over his Democratic opponents. 
Two months later, he again set out for Columbus.10
Wade's second term in the legislature in many ways paralleled 
the first. Again he proved his independence by taking a strong 
stand against slavery and for the abolition of imprisonment for 
debt. When other issues were at stake, however, he was a loyal
Whig who supported the party through thick and thin.
Opposition to slavery remained first and foremost among his 
radical ideas. If his outspoken attacks on human bondage had made 
him unpopular with some of his constituents* his determined stand 
had also made him famous. Fully aware of the fact that his 
antislavery attitude had contributed to his defeat in 1839 and that 
conservative Whigs were blaming the party’s defeat on 
abolitionists, he began exactly where he had left off two years 
earlier, on December 23, 1842, he presented his first petition of 
the session* and for weeks he kept up the agitation against the 
“peculiar institution.11 The abolition of slavery in the District 
of Columbia, repeal of the state’s fugitive slave law, 
nullification of the Black Codes, the establishment of schools for 
black children-- these were the subjects which he consistently kept 
before the legislators by presenting petitions from abolitionists 
in his district.
There were still other ways in which Wade proved his 
unrelenting commitment to the antislavery cause. In January* 1842* 
the Qhio legislature was considering a motion to censure John 
Quincy Adams for his introduction in the national Mouse of 
Representatives* of a petition to dissolve the Union. Wade 
vigorously supported moves for an indefinite postponement of the 
motion of censure while heatedly answering his Democratic 
opponents.11
Just as Wade refused to heed the consequences of his 
antislavery position* so he refused to worry about the feet that
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his attitude on economic problems had contributed to his defeat in 
1839. Since he was a strong believer in the abolition el 
imprisonment for debt, in spite of his party*« opposition to 
reform, he couldn't sit by idly when efforts were being made to 
modify it. He therefore joined with just eight other senators and 
defied his party by voting in favor of a bill to do away with 
imprisonment for debt*
But all these instances of radicalism didn't make him any less 
a Whig. During his second term, as during the first, he considered 
the Whig party the only acceptable political organization, and no 
temporary differences of opinion with party leaders could change 
his fundamental loyalties.
When the banking institutions were involved, Wade was in full 
accord with his party. Considering Jacksonian suspicions of a 
money power merely a sham, he believed that the Democrats were 
really interested in an unusual financial system to enable 
unscrupulous manipulators to enrich themselves at the expense of 
the public. And what he thought to be true of Ohio, he believed 
to be true of the entire country. When President Tyler succeeded 
Harrison and began vetoing his party's financial measures, Wade was 
utterly disgusted.*2
Wade worked hard to foil his Democratic opponents at every 
turn* Voting against a resolution to return to ex-President 
Jackson a $1,000 fine which the General had been forced to pay in 
Hew Orleans for contempt of court, Wade also opposed a Democratic 
measure to repeal the charters of offending corporations, sponsored
55
a successful measure to regulate the rates of interest at a maximum 
of seven percent, and engaged in research on a measure to reform 
the county jails. In spite of his radical convictions, he proved 
to be as good a Whig as all the rest.
From 184 3-1847, Wade held no public office. It was during 
this retirement from active political life that his devotion to his 
party would be most severely tested. Abolitionists in Ohio had 
organized the Liberty party, and during the coming years, advocates 
of independent antislavery parties increased in importance. Since 
most of their support came from former Whigs, and since 
abolitionism was especially strong on the Western Reserve, ever 
mounting pressure was brought to bear on antislavery Whigs to join 
the new organization. Wade*s brother Ned joined the Liberty party, 
and Joshua Giddings, after resisting the appeal of the splinter 
group for several years, became a Free Soiler in 1848. Wade 
remained true to his Whig faith. This decision, more than anything 
else, was to cause a complete estrangement between Wade and his 
former law partner.
That Wade remained within the fold of the Whig party as long 
as there was any hope for its continued existence should come as 
little surprise. The points of agreement were numerous. He 
believed in a protective tariff, so did the Whigs; he believed in 
a limited executive, so did the Whigs; he believed that slavery 
shouldn't be spread by the federal government, so did the Whigs, 
or so it seemed. "Independent enough to disregard party discipline 
when it appeared necessary, he nevertheless loathed impractical
schemers who had a tendency to contribute to the success of the 
common enemy."13 By 1847, his loyalty was rewarded when he vil 
elected by party leaders to the presiding judgeship of the third 
Ohio judicial circuit.
Eighteen-forty-eight however, marked the beginning of the end 
of the Whig party in Ohio. Antislavery Whigs had never approved 
of the war with Mexico, now they demanded passage of the Wilmot 
Proviso to keep slavery out of the territories. At the very least, 
they wanted a presidential candidate opposed to human bondage. 
State leaders of the party, who had generally favored either ex- 
Governor Thomas Corwin or Justice John McLean for the nomination, 
found it almost impossible to keep their organization together when 
General Zachary Taylor, the owner of one-hundred slaves, was 
nominated instead. Thousands deserted the party.
On the Western Reserve, the nomination of a man believed to 
be friendly toward slavery caused tremendous excitement. Giddings 
walked out of the party to support Martin Van Buren, whom the Free 
Soilers nominated. Many prominent Whigs followed suit. They 
simply refused to vote for a slaveholder.
Almost alone among influential Whigs upon the Reserve, Wade 
not only refused to bolt, but campaigned actively for Taylor. His 
decision was not an easy one. Old friends turned away from him, 
the local press derided him, and his motives were constantly 
questioned. But he never wavered. Wade continued "to adhere 
persistently, obstinately to the whig party, to the grief of many 
admiring friends."14
Wade18 dislike for third party movements was not the oh||p 
reason for his position. Under no circumstances was he willing fcf; 
support Van Buren, for he believed that the ex-President had beeh 
much too friendly to slaveholders in the past, A vote for Van 
Buren, he reasoned, would be a vote for Lewis Cass and the 
Democrats, and Cass was sympathetic to the South. Taylor, on the 
other hand, with his strong Unionism, seemed uncommitted* 
Therefore, Wade decided to stand by his party.
Wade's efforts on behalf of Taylor seemed to be in vain# 
however. Not only did he lose Ohio, but Van Buren and his Free 
Soilers carried most of the Reserve counties. Moreover, Giddings 
was sent triumphantly back to congress. For the time being# it 
seemed as if Wade had made a major mistake. His own prospects in 
Ashtabula appeared dim.
But Wade did not despair. The victorious Taylor remembered 
WAde's loyalty and, to the disgust of Giddings, made Wade the 
arbiter of federal patronage on the Reserve.
With Taylor in office, Wade seemed vindicated, for no 
antislavery Whig had reason for complaint. In 1850, Henry Clay's 
compromise measures were introduced in Congress. Because they 
provided for popular sovereignty in Utah and New Mexico, continued 
to sanction slaveholding in the District of Columbia# and above all 
proposed the passage of a new fugitive slave law, the radicals 
detested them. But so did the President. Determined that Hew 
Mexico should be admitted without passing through a territorial 
stage# he fought the Compromise. Taylor was# indeed# living up to
Mate9*: expectation*.
In July# 1850, however, the situation changed. Taylor died 
and Millard Fillmore assumed the presidency. Fillmore had 
originally been placed on the whig ticket to pacify the northern 
wing of the party. Now he came out in favor of the Compromise 
measures and he exerted all his efforts in their favor. Within two 
months of his accession the Compromise of 1850 had been enacted.
For radical Northern Whigs these developments were very 
disturbing. They were being asked to support a Chief Executive who 
had signed the Fugitive Slave Law. For Wade, these events meant 
an end to compromise. No matter how loyal he had been to the Whig 
party he couldnft support so hated a measure as the Fugitive Slave 
Law. He now embarked on a speaking tour in and around Ohio, 
denouncing the law.
In 1850-51, a U.S. senator was to be chosen in Ohio. Because 
the Free Soilers held the balance of power in the state 
legislature, it was obvious that only a strong antislavery leader 
could be elected, one acceptable to both the third party and to one 
of the old parties. Since Wade was one of the few antislavery 
Whigs on the Western Reserve who had not bolted in 1848, he became 
available as a compromise candidate. On March 15, 1851, on the 
twenty-eighth ballot, he was elected.
Wade had remained true to his convictions all along. That he 
disapproved of third party movements he had shown beyond all doubt 
in 1848, and all Free Soilers who voted for him knew it. But that 
he hated slavery, they also knew. It was precisely because of this
tbit they voted for him. For three more years he was to stand 
loyally §y hie party, always in the hope that the antislavery causa 
sight hast he served by Whig victories. When his conviction was 
filially proven wrong in 1854, he was among the first to switch to 
the new Republican administration.
the pattern of Wade's behavior was fixed from the very 
beginning of his first term in the Senate* He was first and 
foremost an opponent of slavery, and he expressed antislavery 
opinions regardless of popular opinion. Consequently, he never 
failed to give his vote to any project designed to curb the 
expansion of slavery, no matter how unpopular.
In matters other than the slavery struggle, Wade also 
established a firm pattern of behavior during his first year in 
Congress. He remained loyal to Whig party measures such as 
protection for industry, government aid to projects of internal 
improvement, and a homestead bill. But as he had shown in 
Columbus, he was by no means blind to the faults of his own party. 
He would remain an independent antislavery Whig as long as there 
was a Whig party.
When it came time to nominate a Whig for president in 1852, 
Wade made it clear that he still considered the Whigs to be the 
party of freedom. When Winfield Scott received the nomination, 
Wade stumped the state of Ohio, everywhere portraying Scott as a 
radical antislavery candidate. Such talk alienated and angered 
many Southern Whigs.15 As the returns came in, it became evident 
that Wade's efforts had been wasted. The Democrats swept Ohio and
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the rest of the country.
Wade's hands had always been tied as long as he remained a 
Whig. He was a man with radical ideas confined in an essentially 
conservative organization. Wade seems never to have fully 
understood that the Whig party had generally drawn its strength 
from men of property in the South as well as the North. He was 
able to defy his party at times, even take radical positions in the 
antislavery struggle, but he was always limited. "The coarse, 
plainspoken Wade was far too • • • radical on the slavery question 
to wield influence over a conglomerate party."16
The new Republican party was much more congenial to Wade. Not 
as impractical as its Free Soil and Liberty predecessors, it was 
nevertheless an organization which was able to attract all forces 
opposed to slavery. Wade became one of its most enthusiastic 
supporters from the first.
When Congress reassembled in December, 1853, Wade most likely 
had no thought of abandoning a party to which he had belonged for 
so long. But within a few weeks, the introduction of the Kansas- 
Nebraska Act was to throw the entire political system into 
disarray.
As soon as it became apparent that the Kansas-Nebraska bill 
would be coupled with the repeal of the Missouri Compromise, Ohio 
antislavery men went into action, as Chase and Giddings authored 
their "Appeal of the Independent Democrats." The manifesto had 
originally been entitled "To the People of Ohio," and Wade had 
actually signed and endorsed it. But the authors were not
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satisfied. Determined to gain as much publicity for their 
Independent Democratic party as possible, they decided to rename 
the work. The final draft was never submitted to Wade, who had no 
use for the Democrats, independent or otherwise.
The absence of Wade's signature from the Appeal did not mean 
that he did not agree with it as he was careful to point out in the 
Senate. When Senator Stephen A. Douglas attacked Chase and the 
other signers for publishing the document, Chase explained that 
Wade had also approved it. Wade now took advantage of this 
opportunity. Addressing the Senate, he avowed that he now endorsed 
•'every word" of the Appeal, and joined ranks with other 
antislavery senators to fight against the Kansas-Nebraska Act. To 
give his blessings to a document like the Appeal was a daring step 
for Wade, for he was still a Whig.
The manifesto created an immediate sensation. Huge rallies 
against the Kansas-Nebraska bill were held in community after 
community. In Ohio, several papers printed the Appeal in its 
original form, with Wade's as well as Chase's and Giddings1 name 
on it.18
Wade had his say about the Kansas-Nebraska bill on February 
6, when he rose in the Senate to deliver a long speech against it. 
Still appealing to the patriotism of Whigs throughout the country, 
he called upon his Southern colleagues to stand by the solemn 
compact made at the time of the admission of Missouri. The 
fathers, he affirmed, had believed that the territories "should be 
fenced up from the intrusion of this accursed scourge of mankind,
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human slavery/1 but the bill violated this principle. He once 
again proclaimed his utter distaste for the institution and his 
conviction that the federal government should have nothing to do 
with it.
Am I obliged, as a member of the Government of the United 
States, to acknowledge your title to a slave? No sir, never. 
Before I would do it, I would expatriate myself; for I am a 
believer in the Declaration of Independence. I believe that 
it was a declaration of Almighty God, that all men are created 
free and equal, and have the same inherent rights. . . . You 
may call me an Abolitionist if you will. I care but little 
for that; for if an undying hatred for slavery and oppression 
constitutes an Abolitionist, I am that Abolitionist.19
This speech really marked Wade's entrance as an antislavery 
agitator in Congress. Before, he rarely spoke, offering instead 
silent support of measures of which he approved. As one of the 
chief opponents of the Kansas-Nebraska Act, however, he had become 
one of the slaveholders' most outspoken antagonists.
Wade denounced the "slave power," but his greatest contempt 
was reserved for Northern allies of slaveholders. Douglas he 
especially despised. Again and again he clashed with the Little 
Giant, and on one occasion, after Chase had replied to a Douglas 
speech, Wade said: "But sir, 1 need not refer further to the
speech of the Senator from Illinois. My colleague so entirely
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pulverized that speech that there is not enough left upon which a 
man can hang an idea."20
Senator Norris of New Hampshire was another Northern Democrat 
whose efforts on behalf of slaveholders irked Wade. When Norris 
asked Chase whether he would ever live up to his constitutional 
obligations and aid in the return of a fugitive slave, Wade 
answered that he never did nor ever would assist in executing that 
law.21
The debates in Congress, the failure of the Whigs to sustain 
their Northern colleagues, and the general bitterness brought on 
by the repeal of the Missouri Compromise gradually led Wade, along 
with many others, to search for new political alignments. Up to 
that time, he had still considered himself a Whig, but now he was 
prepared to disavow completely the organization.
His break with the Whig party was no sudden, impulsive move. 
In Ohio, as in other states, a fusion movement was beginning to 
take shape. Former Whigs, some Democrats, Free Boilers, and 
Independent Democrats, as well as Know Nothings, were coming 
together in common resentment against Stephen A* Douglas * scheme. 
Wade joined this movement and urged ail those who opposed the 
extension of slavery to do the same.
It waa on May 25 that Wade announced his final break with the 
Whig organization. The passage of the Kansas-Nebraska Act in the 
House of Representatives three days earlier was the last straw. 
If the lower House, where the North was better represented than in 
the upper, was unable to suste .the Missouri Compromise, then the
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Senate, "this rotten borough department of the Government where the 
voice of the people is scarcely heard at all,** certainly could not 
do ahythlng. He had been a Whig all his life, had supported Whig 
presidential candidates for the South, and relied upon Southern 
honor for the safety of Northern rights. He would do so no more. 
Southern Whigs had betrayed him by joining with the enemy behind 
his back, and until the injustice brought on by the Kansas-Nebraska 
Act was undone, all possibility of compromise was gone. As for his 
future political alignment, he minced no words. "I am an 
Abolitionist at heart while in the slave cursed atmosphere of this 
capital," he concluded, "whatever I may be at home. But here pride 
and self-respect compel a man either to be a dough-face, flunky, 
or an abolitionist, and I choose the latter. I glory in the
3 2name." From that time on, Wade exerted all his influence to 
further the new party, as yet nameless, but soon to be called 
Republican.
Like Giddings, Wade was alarmed by the early nativist 
influence in the party. Had he been merely a self-serving 
politician, he could have benefited from the new movement. As a 
native-born descendant of America*s earliest Protestant settlers, 
he would have been welcomed with open arms by the new organisation. 
Instead, he not only refused to negotiate with the Know Nothings, 
but he also went out of his way to provoke them. In the spring of 
1854, when nativism was at its peak, Wade spoke out for the 
immigrants, saying,
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These poor men do not deserve the harsh epithets which have 
been indiscriminately applied to foreigners. . . .  we are all 
either immigrants or the descendants of immigrants, and it
cannot certainly be of much importance at what particular
2 3period the emigration took place?
Benjamin F. Wade, then, while a radical for certain, also 
provides a contrast to Joshua Giddings. If Giddings was a staunch 
Whig, Wade was even more so, for he refused to abandon the party 
almost until its last gasping breath. The main difference between 
the two men was really one of methods. While both were skeptical 
of third party organizations, Giddings jumped to the Free Soilers, 
while Wade continued to pursue antislavery goals through the Whig 
organization.
Some have tried to portray Wade as being less radical than 
Giddings but this would be difficult to prove. While it is true 
that Wade was able to remain in the Republican party long after 
Giddings and his radical convictions had been muscled out, at no 
point did Wade betray his antislavery convictions. He was many 
years ahead of his time with statements such as, "I hold to the old 
Whig doctrine. . . . that ALL are equal . . .  without regard to 
color.11 Giddings could scarcely have uttered anything more 
radical. Beyond this, however, it also reflects Wade's belief that 
the Whig party was based on the principles of equality. This 
belief helps explain Wade's obstinate loyalty to the Whig party 
even when Giddings was jumping to the Free Soilers.
Slavery and, beyond that, equality were truly moral issues for 
As he put it,
I know it is said that the African is an inferior race, 
Incapable of defending his own rights. My ethics teach 
me. . . [that]they are still human; they are animated by 
the same hopes, they are afflicted with the same sorrows; 
they are actuated by the same motives that we are.
These principles were to remain the platform of the Republican 
party.
As has been shown, Wade was a self-proclaimed abolitionist. 
In this sense, he was much like Giddings in that it was his hope 
to achieve abolitionist goals through the existing party system. 
He believed that the Whig party was based upon the principles of 
liberty. As such, it provided the perfect means for fighting 
slavery. Third party organizations, like the Free Soilers, served 
only to draw away Whig votes and aid the Democrats. While this was 
a conviction held by Giddings as well, Wade continued to believe 
it almost until the Whig party was no more.
At any rate, the two men together provide evidence for the 
diversity, not only of the early Republicans, but of the radical 
faction within the Republican party. Giddings and Wade, both 
radicals, nevertheless, despised each other. The only thing that 
brought them together under the Republican tent was a firm 
commitment to antislavery principles. Giddings had been a Whig and 
a Free Soiler because he believed these organizations to be the
best vehicles for antislavery sentiment* Wade had remained a 
for the same reason. Both men, alike in many ways but different 
** well, now joined the Republican ranks because they recognized 
as an opportunity to unite all antislavery factions, radical as 
as not, under one party label.
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Chapter 3 
Lyman Trumbull
Benjamin Wade and Joshua Giddings can easily be classified as 
radicals. Lyman Trumbull is not so easily categorized. While he 
did work closely with the radicals, at the same time he exhibited 
conservative tendencies. Historians have traditionally shied away 
from writing about Trumbull because they have encountered 
difficulty in putting him into a specific category. Writers often 
refer to Trumbull as a radical and sometimes as a conservative, 
often with littlr* justification for either term.
Lyman Trumbull was, throughout his long political career, a 
“conservative radical.M This term is very ambiguous and seemingly 
paradoxical, but it does describe Trumbull's peculiar ability to 
be basically a conservative who at times advocated radical 
political and economic ideas and measures. The Chicago Tribune 
editorialized in 1872 that "no American statesman has ever stood 
so nearly midway between the violence of fanaticism on both 
sides."1
Whereas Wade and Giddings had come to the Republican party 
from radical ranks, Trumbull was a Democrat. Furthermore, he came 
from a political tradition of opposition to Negro rights. He was 
numbered among those early Republicans who made little distinction 
between free Negroes and slaves, and felt that association with any 
black degraded the white race. "I want nothing to do, either with 
the free negro or the slave negro • • he once said. "We wish
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to settle the Territories with free white men.1,2
Trumbull was born in Colchester, Connecticut in 1813, and this 
was where he spent his boyhood. Of his formal education, little 
is known. Although his father and grandfather were Yale graduates, 
financial difficulties prevented him from having similar advantages 
of education.
Trumbull began his adult life as a teacher. From 1833-36, he 
filled a position as principal of Greenville Academy in Georgia. 
While in Greenville, he employed his leisure hours reading law in 
the office of the judge of the superior court of Georgia. There 
is no record of his impressions of slavery during this sojourn in 
the South, "but it is easy to surmise that the Connecticut Yankee 
didn't like it and that he was eager to return to the North."3 In 
1837 he was admitted to practice by the Georgia courts and in the 
fall of that year he journeyed to Illinois.
After settling in Belleville, Trumbull apparently lost no time 
in becoming involved in public affairs for on November 23, 1840, 
he entered the Illinois House of Representatives. He was elected 
as a Democrat and soon became one of the state's most important 
Democratic leaders.
Three months after Trumbull took his seat in the Illinois 
legislature, Stephen A. Douglas resigned the office of secretary 
of state of Illinois to take a seat on the state supreme court, and 
Trumbull was appointed to fill the vacancy. He held the position 
until March, 1843, when he resigned because of a political feud 
with Governor Ford.4 In February, 1846, his name was presented to
the Democratic State Convention for the office of governor of the 
state- He was, however, defeated. In that same year he was 
nominated for Congress by the Democrats of the First District but 
was also defeated in that race. After his defeat he returned to 
his Belleville law practice.
True to his New England heritage, Trumbull detested slavery, 
for it outraged his moral sensibilities. At the same time, he was 
opposed to abolitionism and to interference with slavery in the 
slave states. Trumbull took an active part in antislavery 
agitation when in late 1837 he traveled in southern Illinois 
lecturing against slavery. He also gathered signatures on a 
petition that would prohibit the slave trade between the states and 
abolish slavery in the District of Columbia. In doing so, Trumbull 
was putting himself in danger of being associated with abolitionist 
principles, for the mid-1830s witnessed the rise of abolitionist 
petition drives.
The motivation for this speaking tour most likely had to do 
with the killing of Rev. Elijah P. Lovejoy. Lovejoy, though an 
abolitionist, was not of the Garrisonian fire-and-brimstone school. 
It was his plan to publish a newspaper in Alton, Illinois which 
would discuss the slavery issue. A mob learned of his plan and 
murdered Lovejoy. Trumbull gives some of his first opinions on the 
slavery controversy in a letter to his father dated November 12, 
1837. He says, •• As much as I am opposed to the immediate 
emancipation of the slaves and to the doctrine of Abolitionism, yet 
I am more opposed to mob violence and outrage, and had I been in
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Alton, I would have cheerfully marched to the rescue of Mr. Lovejoy
c
and his property."
While his attempts to win an elective office were 
unsuccessful, Trumbull*s law practice prospered. He was rapidly 
gaining a reputation as a learned and effective trial lawyer. He 
devoted himself, however, to cases which brought him no money and 
whose political benefit was doubtful. These cases involved Negroes 
who were held in virtual slavery by a system of indenture. 
Trumbull considered the system, which stemmed from the complicated 
legal history of slavery in Illinois, to be immoral and illegal. 
His reputation as an antislavery lawyer grew.6
Considering the proslavery sentiments of the great majority 
of the inhabitants of Belleville and the county where Trumbull 
practiced law, his fight for the abolition of the remnants of 
slavery and the indenture system was an act of great personal and 
political courage. Even during his political association with John 
Reynolds, his patron and mentor and leader of the proslavery forces 
in Illinois, Trumbull did not compromise his opposition to slavery. 
After paying tribute to several Illinois lawyers who fought against 
slavery, Dwight Harris, the author of the only comprehensive 
history of slavery in Illinois, stated, "Chief among them [the 
antislavery lawyers] was Trumbull, whose name should be written 
large in antislavery annals. . . .  In politics he was an old-time 
Democrat with no leanings toward abolitionism, but possessing an 
honest desire to see justice done to the Negro in Illinois*11 ^
In 1847, a new constitution was adopted by the state of
Illinois which reduced the number of judges on the supreme court 
from nine to three. The state was divided into three districts, 
each to select one member of the court. Trumbull was elected judge 
for the southern district in 1848. He accepted a reelection as 
judge in 1852 but resigned a year and a half later because the 
salary was insufficient to support his family. After this he 
retired from politics.
The introduction by Stephen A. Douglas of the Kansas-Nebraska 
bill on January 4, 1854, brought Trumbull as it did Abraham 
Lincoln, out of political retirement. Political indignation in 
Illinois ran high. Abolitionist agitation, which was subdued for 
a long time, was revived. Both the Whig and the Democratic papers 
in Illinois devoted little space to the slavery question in the 
years 1851-53. The Compromise of 1850 was generally considered an 
adequate settlement. Illinois was content to accept the fact that 
both the Whigs and the Democrats in their national conventions in 
1852 officially affirmed that they would “adhere to a faithful 
execution of the acts known as the compromise measure settled by 
the last Congress.**
The reaction in Illinois to the passage of the Kansas-Nebraska 
Act was swift and bitter. The Missouri Compromise had in Illinois 
an added sanctity because the bill incorporating the compromise 
measure had been introduced in the Senate by Senator Jesse B. 
Thomas of Illinois. Thus it was particularly important to tVe 
people of Illinois who took natural pride in a measutO which was 
federally credited with saving and preserving the internal peace
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and tranquility of the nation.
Trumbull was now forty-one. He joined Gustave Koerner and 
other Democrats in organizing the Eighth Congressional District in 
opposition to Douglas and his Kansas-Nebraska bill. The Eighth 
Congressional District was the strongest Democratic district in the 
state, but the political parties had been thrown into such disorder 
by the Kansas-Nebraska bill that no regular nominations were made 
by either the Whigs or the Democrats. Trumbull announced himself 
as an anti-Nebraska Democratic candidate and was elected over 
Philip B. Fouke, who ran independently as a Douglas Democrat.
In spite of the growing swell of public protest, Douglas was 
successful in having the Illinois legislature pass a resolution 
endorsing the Kansas-Nebraska bill. But this victory was a hollow 
one, for it revealed within the Democratic party the emergence of 
a strong anti-Nebraska faction that adamantly rejected Douglas1 
leadership on the Kansas issue, and that didn't hesitate to vote 
with the Whigs.
Among the Democrat?, who voted in the state senate against 
Douglas1 policies were John Palmer, Norman B. Judd, and Burton C. 
Cook. All three of these men later became Trumbull's close 
political associates in the anti-Nebraska movement. Gradually, the 
bitterness of Douglas and his supporters made the position of the 
anti-Nebraskaites within the Democratic party untenable. Meetings 
of anti-Nebraska Democrats wore held in many parts of the state. 
A meeting at Freeport adopted a resolution to organize a new 
political party.9
Douglas* opponents, anti-Nebraska Democrats and Whigs alike, 
had concentrated their entire campaign on the repeal of the 
Missouri Compromise almost to the total exclusion of other issues. 
The Chicago Tribune wrote that the
Nebraska bill opens a great highway for the onward march of 
slavery. . . .  If we must choose, we choose where humanity 
stands upright and free. We will give no quarter to traitors, 
but follow to his political grave every man who betrays 
freedom.10
Many antislavery men in Illinois believed the Nebraska bill 
was the result of the appeasement policies pursued in dealing with 
an aggressive and arrogant South. In reading the verbatim reports 
of the speeches made by the anti-Nebraska leaders at countless 
protest meetings held throughout the state, one constantly comes 
across the slogan "Slavery is Sectional, Liberty is National."
Eventually the great wave of protest which swept the country 
after the passage of the Kansas-Nebraska bill resulted in a mass 
movement, which, after two years, culminated in the organization 
of the Republican party. But until the summer of 1856, the future 
of the anti-Nebraska movement was by no means assured. In Illinois 
there was no central organization whatever in 1854. The men who 
opposed Douglas were Whigs, anti-Nebraska Democrats, Free Soilers, 
and Know Nothings who had united temporarily in order to attain a 
common goal—  namely, the voicing of their opposition to the 
Kansas-Nebraska bill* So it was that Democrats like Palmer,
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Koerner, and Trumbull broke away from the Douglas Democrats.
Opposition to the Kansas-Nebraska Act proved to be a powerful 
force for unity. Antislavery im, including free soilers,
abolitionists, antislavery Whigs, and antislavery Democrats met at 
several conventions throughout the state in the summer of 1854. 
At the Ottawa meeting the name "Republican” was suggested for the 
new antislavery party. The last regional convention was held on 
August 30 at Rockford. It represented eight counties of northern 
Illinois and was called to "prevent the still further extension of 
slavery, and to protect the interests of free labor and free men." 
The Rockford convention adopted a set of strong antislavery 
resolutions including a demand for a free Kansas, for Congressional 
legislation prohibiting slavery in the territories, for the
abolition of slavery in the District of Columbia, and for repeal 
of the Fugitive Slave Law.11
On September 7, 1854, a group of antislavery men issued, in 
Springfield, a call for a "mass convention" to be held at the State 
Capitol on October 5, the second day of the Illinois State 
Agricultural Fair. the call declared that the convention was 
called "for the organization of a party which shall put the
government upon a Republican tack and to secure to non-slaveholders 
throughout the Union their just and constitutional weight in the 
councils of the nation."12 The call did not spell out any
abolitionist objectives; on the contrary it was a rather moderate 
appeal to antislavery men to meet and fight for a common cause.
The resolutions adopted by this convention were moderate if
dn righ conservative. The platform condemned the Kansas* 
Nebraska Act and the repeal of the Missouri Compromise. It 
expressed opposition to the extension of slavery, but it did not 
demand repeal of the Fugitive Slave Law, and it did not propose 
interference with slavery in the states where it already existed. ^
Trumbull delivered a speech at the fair in answer to Douglas. 
In it, he attacked the Nebraska Act and decried the repeal of the 
Missouri Compromise. He ridiculed Douglas* theory of popular 
sovereignty and charged that it was designed to make Kansas a slave 
state.14
By the time the fair was held, Trumbull had already decided 
to become a candidate for the House from the Eighth District. At 
this point he had been out of politics since 1846. During most of 
1853 and 1854 he was dangerously ill and his doctors were unable 
to diagnose his illness. His family feared that he would not 
recover, yet he did and his recovery seemed to coincide with the 
passage of Douglas* act. Trumbull now believed that his recovery 
was an act of God to allow him to lead the battle against the 
spread of slavery.15
Upon his return to Belleville, Trumbull turned his attention 
to the forthcoming Congressional elections. The anti-Nebraska 
Democrats, with Trumbull leading the way, served notice that they 
would not support any pro-Nebraska nominee, and when the Democratic 
Convention of the Eighth Congressional District met on September 
5, 1854, at Carlyle, it split so deeply on the issue that it 
adjourned without naming a candidate. It was obvious that the old
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l irty lines we ■> becoming blurred and .iat there would be two 
candidates in ie election, a Douglas Nebraskaite and an anti- 
Nebraskaite supported by many Democrats and Whigs. The Whig 
leaders in the district, realizing that they had no chance to elect 
their own man, announced that they would support an anti-Nebraska 
Democrat and urged Trumbull to run.
Philip B. Fouke, a Belleville lawyer and former Prosecuting 
Attorney of St. Clair County, announced his candidacy and stated 
his support for the Kansas-Nebraska Act and the repeal of the 
Missouri Compromise. Fouke was a formidable candidate. Only by 
uniting behind an equally strong candidate could the antislavery 
movement hope to win.
On October 10, a month after Fouke was in the field, Trumbull 
announced his candidacy and was immediately endorsed by both 
Democratic and Whig newspapers. Trumbull conducted an aggressive 
campaign. He often addressed several meetings in single day and 
proved himself effective on the stump. Still, it was only Mby the 
greatest efforts" of Trumbull's Democratic and Whig supporters that 
he won the election.16
The election and the bitterness engendered between Trumbull 
and his followers and the Nebraska pro-Douglas men, forced Trumbull 
to give serious consideration to his position in the Democratic 
party. The hard-fought campaign in the Eighth Congressional 
District underscored the split in the Democratic party. Trumbull
attacked as a renegade and a traitor*17
There is little reason to believe that the contemplated break
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with the Democratic party was particularly painful to Trumbull. 
He was not what one would call a party man. Many years later he 
said, ”1 never was a party man to the extent of being willing to 
serve the party against my country.” And, Clarence Darrow said of 
him that he ”has been too consistent to bind himself irretrievably 
to any party.”18 Dedicated as he was to the fight against Douglas* 
policies, he was ready to incur the wrath of some of his Illinois 
friends by making a bid for election to the United States Senate.
When the legislature met in Springfield, the situation was 
uncertain and confused. It required fifty-one votes to elect a 
senator, and the forty-six anti-Nebraska Whigs were a unit for 
Abraham Lincoln, the Whig candidate. Lincoln, therefore, resigned 
his seat in the legislature and became a candidate. However, the 
few Abolitionists distrusted him, and the five anti-Nebraska 
Democrats held the balance of power. When balloting began, Lincoln 
took the lead on the first ballot. For some time balloting 
proceeded with little change, but on the sixth poll Lincoln began 
to lose strength and, by the ninth, it appeared as if Governor 
Matteson, a Douglas Democrat, would capture the seat. When Lincoln 
saw his chances growing dim, he swung his votes over to the anti- 
Nebraska Democratic candidate, Trumbull. On the tenth ballot 
Trumbull was elected.
Trumbull was not a Republican when he was elected to the 
Senate in 1855. Neither were such other men as Henry Wilson, 
William H. Seward, and John P. Hale, all of whom were elected to 
the Senate in 1855. Especially in Illinois, where one would have
expected Lincoln's gesture in baching Trumbull and his gracious 
acceptance of defeat to have promoted unity among anti-Nebraska 
men, suspicions between Whigs and anti-Nebraska Democrats remained 
strong. In the long run, however, these senatorial elections would 
be very important to the Republican movement, as would be clear in 
the 1856 congressional session when Hale, Seward, Wilson, and 
Trumbull would assume the leadership of the new party.
It was as yet an open question whether a fusion of such 
diverse elements could ever be affected, and it was precisely 
because the five anti-Nebraska Democrats were determined to 
maintain their party identity that Trumbull captured a seat in the 
Senate. He did this when the five men refused to vote for anyone 
else.
Trumbull's election was significant for a number of reasons. 
First, it was an anti-Nebraska victory and a humiliating defeat for 
the Democratic party. It was obviously a bitter pill for Douglas 
to have an anti-Nebraska Democrat as a colleague in the Senate. 
Second, as a U.S. Senator, Trumbull occupied a strategic position 
for organizing opposition to Douglas within his own party. 
Moreover, his election paved the way for fusion of the anti- 
Nebraska Democrats with most of the Whigs because his election by 
their combined votes brought the two groups closer together. 
Eventually, the two groups would become important parts of the new 
Republican party. The election of Trumbull was not only an 
important step in the evolution of the anti-Nebraska Democrats from 
rebels within their own party to membership in a new party * bet it
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also made possible their ascendancy in that party in 1856,
.-Trumbull's election astounded the Democrats. They were more 
disa, pointed by it than they would have been by the election of 
Lincoln. They regarded Trumbull as m  arch-traitor. When he began 
opening fire on the Nebraska bill as soon as he took his seat in 
the Senate he confirmed their hostility.
Jolted by Trumbull's election, the Douglas Democrats began a 
move to prevent him from taking his seat on the ground that the 
Illinois Constitution made judges of the state Supreme Court 
ineligible for any state or federal position during the term of 
office for which they had been elected and for one year thereafter. 
Since Trumbull was re-elected in June, 1852, for a nine year term, 
it was contended that the law applied to him. Trumbull, upon 
learning of the plot contacted Abraham Lincoln, and the two began 
their close coordination toward the slow, cautious formation of a 
Republican party in Illinois.
Trumbull believed that caution was necessary because he did 
not think that the anti-Nebraska Democrats of the state were, as 
yet, ready to join a new party, and there was little sentiment for 
a fusion with the Whigs. The only issue which might possibly unite 
the diverse elements was opposition to the extension of slavery.19
First, however, he had to get the Senate to confirm his 
election. The consideration of his eligibility was long and 
protracted. During the several months of the controversy, Trumbull 
did all he could to make a good impression on the Senate. In his 
few speeches, delivered between December, 1855, and March, 1856,
Trumbull was careful to stress that he considered himself to be a 
good Democrat, that he was not an abolitionist, that he advocated 
the enforcement of the Fugitive Slave Law, and that he was opposed 
to any interference with slavery in the states where it existed. 
He did tell the Senate that he opposed the extension of slavery and 
believed in the right of Congress to prohibit slavery in the 
territories. On the whole, then, his was a thoroughly moderate 
and respectable position. Trumbull obviously was determined not 
to antagonize the Southerners, whose votes he needed for the 
confirmation of his seating. Answering those who spoke out against 
him, Trumbull said that he believed the clause in the Illinois 
Constitution to be inoperative because he had resigned from the 
Illinois Supreme Court more than a year and a half ago. He added 
that "the spirit of the Constitution of the state of Illinois does 
not apply to my case, though it is possible that its letter may.1'21 
In the final vote Trumbull's right to sit was confirmed by a count 
Of 35 to 8.
By the time Trumbull was ready to leave Illinois for 
Washington in late November, 1855, he was still a Democrat and 
Lincoln was still a Whig, but both men were united in their 
determination to stop the extension of slavery. They were ready, 
sometime soon, to organize a new fusion party on a platform of 
restoration of Kansas, and opposition to the further extension of 
slavery. It was a moderate platform, not because Trumbull and 
ilneoln opposed the abrogation of the Fugitive Slave Law and the 
abolition of slavery in the District of Columbia. Rather, the
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platform was moderate because Trumbull and Lincoln were shrewd 
politicians and 1856 was a Presidential election year. They knew 
that only on such a limited platform could they hope to elect a 
Republican governor, get a majority in the legislature, and carry 
the state for a Republican nominee.
The antislavery people of Illinois and Trumbull himself, felt 
that his primary objective in the Senate was to give battle to 
Douglas and prevent Kansas from becoming a slave state. Trumbull 
soon realized that this was a formidable task. Congress was in the 
midst of a tense struggle over Kansas, and the coalition of 
Southerners and Nebraska Democrats was riding roughshod over the 
minority of antislavery Whigs and free soilers. On a later 
occasion Trumbull described the Senate as it convened at the first 
session of the thirty-fourth Congress on December 3, 1855:
At that time it [the Senate] consisted of sixty-two members, 
of whom fifteen were Republicans. It was a time of high party 
excitement. The majority were domineering and offensive to 
members of the minority. They controlled the business of the 
Senate and could take their own time to assail the minority 
Senators. . . .  It was not uncommon for the members of the 
dominant party to go out of their way to seek controversies 
with and assail certain Senators in the minority . . .22
Trumbull truly had his work cut out for him.
Trumbull did little to disappoint his supporters in Illinois, 
however. Just as the supporters of Douglas had feared, as a U.S.
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Senator Trumbull was outspoken against the policy and doctrines of 
the Democratic party with win h he was still identified. On all 
slavery questions, he acted irect opposition to his colleague, 
Stephen A. Douglas, and tou t bitterly the popular sovereignty 
plan of settling the slavery question in the territories and future 
states.
The fight for a free Kansas, which brought to the fore once 
again the aggressive spirit of the slave states, and the 
intransigence of Southern leaders in Congress, hardened the 
opposition of many Illinoisans. Trumbull received daily scores of 
letters from cities, towns, and villages of Illinois, urging him 
to stand firm and fight for a free Kansas.
Trumbull responded with a three hour speech on the floor of 
Congress. He began with a review of the Kansas-Nebraska Act, 
dwelling first upon the failure of the measure to fix any time when 
the people of a territory should exercise the right of deciding 
whether they should have slavery or not. He illustrated his point 
by citing some resolutions adopted by a handful of squatters in 
Kansas as early as September, 1854, many mcnths before any 
legislature had been organized or elected, in which it was declared 
that the squatters "would exercise the right of expelling from the 
territory, or otherwise punishing any individual, or individuals, 
who may . . . entice away our slaves . . . ” These resolutions, 
Trumbull said, gave proof that the Missourians were giving notice 
beforehand that violence would be used upon any intending settlers 
who might be opposed to the introduction of slavery.
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He went on to assert that the developments in Kansas had 
proven the sham of Douglas' theory of popular sovereignty. 
Launching into a personal attack on his colleague, he told the 
Senate that Douglas had to be held responsible for the acts of 
violence and fraud perpetrated by the proslavery elements in 
Kansas. Trumbull rejected Douglas' contention that the free soil 
settlers were being sent into Kansas to "abolitionize" the 
territory. "What! Abolitionize Kansas!" he said. "It was said 
on all sides of the Senate Chamber, that it was never meant to have 
slavery go into Kansas. What is meant, then, by abolitionizing 
Kansas?" Finally, he called upon Congress to rescind the Kansas- 
Nebraska Act and to restore the Missouri compromise.23
Meanwhile, anti-Nebraska Democrats were every day being pushed 
out of the party as President Pierce's administration attempted to 
make support of the measure a party requirement. Some, perhaps 
even Trumbull, continued to hope that a middle ground could be 
found between supporting repeal of the Missouri Compromise and 
leaving the party. Nevertheless, Trumbull gave his support to a 
fusion convention held in Bloomington which reaffirmed the right 
of Congress to outlaw slavery in the territories and urged a free 
Kansas under a restored Missouri Compromise.
The lingering doubts of men like Trumbull were largely removed 
by the actions of the state Democratic convention. With the 
Douglasites in control, the convention enthusiastically endorsed 
the Nebraska Act and nominated William A. Richardson, the House 
floor manager of the Nebraska bill, to head the state ticket.
Another resolution, adopted by acclamation, censured Trumbull and 
repudiated his claim to being a Democrat. By these actions, the 
regular party organisation forced out the anti-Nebraska Democrats. 
In the aftermath of the Democratic convention, most anti-Douglas 
Democrats endorsed the Bloomington convention.
In June, 1856, at Abraham Lincoln's urging, Trumbull made the 
decision final by attending the Republican National Convention in 
Philadelphia. At the convention, Trumbull exerted all his 
conservative influences in an attempt to secure the nomination of 
a moderate for president.
Lyman Trumbull then, represents a far more conservative 
element in the early Republican party. It would be extremely
difficult to identify him as an abolitionist. He even spoke out 
in favor of the Fugitive Slave Law, and this was a sore point with 
the radicals. Trumbull also had no use for black rights, and much 
of his hesitancy in joining t ie Republlean party had to do with his 
fear that it was in danger of being controlled by radical 
abolitionists.
For Trumbull, more so than for wade or Giddings, the real 
impetus for his switch in party allegiance was the Kansas-Nebraska 
Act and, even more narrowly, the act's repeal of the Missouri 
Compromise. He said in congress, "if the policy [the Missouri 
Compromise] . . • had bean adhered to there would have been no 
difficultyt we should have had no slavery agitation . . ."24 His 
views were far too conservative to permit interference with the 
institution where it already existed. In this sense, he was such
v * J * A * -
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like Abraham Lincoln. He was, however, strongly opposed to the 
eietehslon of slavery, and he harbored a deep resentment for the 
"Slave Power,” which he believed had been appeased too often in the 
past. In these senses, he was closer to a radical position.
Trumbull was a "conservative' radical,” and his movement into 
the Republican ranks cannot be understood without admission of an 
antislavery influence. In Trumbull's view, the party was made up 
of many diverse elements held together by one common thread. He 
said, "When I speak of the Republicans I . . . mean all those who 
on the slavery question singly make this issue, opposition to its 
spread into free territory."25
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Clearly, the origins of our present day Republican party 
cannot be understood without emphasizing the importance of 
antislavery sentiment. The revisionist historians, in their 
efforts to downplay the slavery issue, have missed the mark. Some, 
such as Michael Holt and his Nslave power” hypothesis have come 
closer than others, but for the most part, the true principles 
behind early Republicanism have been deemphasized in favor of 
nativism, temperance, and the tariff.
This lack of agreement, even if disturbing, is not unusual. 
All history, after all, is colored by the era in which it is 
interpreted. Perhaps the best example of this is a slightly later 
period in Republican party history, Radical Reconstruction. For 
many years, the Republicans of this era were portrayed as 
vindictive villains ignoring constitutional law and presidential 
vetoes in sole pursuit of vengeance on a helpless South. Later, 
when civil rights and equality became important catch phrases 
again, these same historical figures were seen as heroes whose only 
objective was the extension of equal rights to all, regardless of 
color.
The attempts to deemphasize slavery*s role in the formation 
of the early Republican party are understandable as well because 
it is difficult for anyone to understand the all-pervasiveness of 
the slavery issue during this period. No issue before or since has 
so absorbed and subordinated all other concerns. There is
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certainly nothing comparable to it today, when single issue 
politics tend to be looked down upon. Perhaps this is because the 
Civil War taught Americans the value of avoiding such practices.
Political thought from this ante-bellum period is also 
difficult to understand because this was, after all, the “golden 
age" of politics, when the affairs of government were the primary 
concern of society at large. This was a time when political 
parties radiated the energies of an entire society. The apparatus 
of party government was more than a device for recording popular 
will. Under such circumstances, politics became the concern of 
virtually everyone in the society and involved them in the affairs 
of government and in the election of officials to serve them. 
Given this fact, and taking into account the extreme pervasiveness 
of the slavery issue, one can understand how the Republican party 
could have risen to prominence on the wings of antislavery 
sentiment.
For a party that was destined to control the Presidency during 
sixty of its first hundred years, the birth of the Republican party 
was, in many ways, unimpressive. Although numerous party members 
later claimed credit for launching or naming the party, nobody of 
any consequence took any interest in it in 1854. The first 
Republican president, Abraham Lincoln, protested against attempts 
to use his name in connection with initial attempts to organize the 
party in Illinois. Thereafter, the party attracted recruits more 
rapidly, but only by partially concealing its name and original 
character. The national committee omitted the word “Republican11
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from its call for nominating conventions in both If56 and I860, 
while one of the leading candidates for the Presidency at the 
latter convention referred to it as ”The National Union 
Convention.”1
There is no single explanation to the paradox that more people 
approved of the Republican party than were willing to join it. 
Some hesitated because of the recent lack of success in third party 
movements. Many, however, were frightened away by the political 
antecedents of the first Republicans, most of whom boasted long 
records as militant foes of slavery.
The stigma attached to the antislavery cause in an era 
notorious for its sympathy with reform movements was due to none 
other than the Abolitionists who conducted a long crusade for 
freedom with little public support. It was not so much what the 
Abolitionists proposed as the provocative tone of their arguments 
that offended people. Garrison for one loved to talk wildly about 
the rights of Negroes ”to cut the throats of their masters.”2 Such 
talk was understandably offensive to many, and their behavior 
increased the danger that anyone who criticized the abuses of the 
slave system would be branded an Abolitionist.
By 1840 the futility of the Abolitionist crusade had convinced 
many antislavery men that abuses could be remedied only through 
political action on a step-by-step basis. These more cautious 
reformers were the men who ultimately organized the Republican 
party. Many of them were as critical of Southern institutions as 
the Abolitionists were, and secretly wished for the same objective.
let they avoided all connection with the Abolitionists and 
Concentrated their initial efforts on legislation to block the 
admission of more slave states^ Many of these advocates of 
political action contested the elections of 1840 and 1844 as 
members of the Liberty party. The public response to this 
organization was discouraging so that by 1848 another group, the 
Free Soilers, made its attempt at third party success. This 
effort, as we have seen, was short-lived as well.
The principal handicap of both third parties was that th sy 
could not sell the moral arguments for the containment of slavery. 
Some creative antislavery men had tried to connect their program 
with sectional economic issues, but this formula made no headway 
until the breakdown of the Compromise of 1850. Both the Democrats 
and Whigs thought they had solved the problem of slavery in the 
territories recently taken from Mexico without any statement about 
the status of slaves. Their optimism was founded on the belief 
that no new territories would be organized in the near future. 
Since neither the territories created in the aftermath of the 
Mexican War nor the remaining Louisiana Purchase territory seemed 
capable of supporting agricult ire, the Compromise advocates 
imagined that the agitation over the expansion of slavery would 
subside.3
In 1854, however, Stephen A. Douglas and the Democrats 
reopened the territorial quarrel and gave the soon to be Republican 
party a rallying point which the Liberty men and Free Soilers had 
lacked. Nobody considered the Great Plains suitable for the
cultivation of cotton, but the ioct that the Douglas bil) divided 
the region into two territories, Kansas and Nebraska, suggested a 
deal to give the South control of Kansas. Many Northerners
indifferent to the plight of the black race thought th'v South was
trying to swindle them out of territory reserved for the free 
farmer. They denounced the proposed amendment repealing the 
Missouri Compromise as a cynical breach of the thirty-year-old 
contract between the sections. Northern congressmen who could not 
be reached by antislavery arguments found themselves cooperating 
with Free Soilers in the fight against the Kansas-Nebraska bill.4
The sudden change in the political climate encouraged Free 
Soilers everywhere to call anti-Nebraska meetings. Although few 
people recognized it at the time, this initial round of protest 
meetings was the beginning of the Republican party. With this 
information in hand, one can possibly strike a compromise with the 
revisionist historians, for the Republican party can be viewed, at 
least in part, as having succeeded by making the slavery issue more 
palatable to northern voters. The Free Soilers had taken a step 
in this direction by narrowing the Liberty party’s focus down to 
the slavery extension question. The Republican party took the next 
logical step and narrowed the issue down to a firm stand against 
the Kansas-Nebraska Act. Such a platform brought together the many 
diverse elements of antislavery antagonism, for all despised the 
Kansas-Nebraska bill.
There is, however, an additional danger in adopting the 
revisionist position. Abraham Lincoln said, "Without the
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institution of slavery, and the colored race as a basis, the war 
could not have an existence.” When the revisionist historians 
minimized the slavery question, they naturally had no choice but 
to see the Civil War as a needless conflict, brought about by a 
blundering generation. By refusing to consider the all-importance 
Of slavery as a moral issue, they denied themselves the ability to 
understand the emotions, north and south, which forced the Union 
to its moment of truth. By thus draining the moral content out of 
history, they reduced the Civil War to an entirely base and wanton 
affair. This interpretation of the Union's greatest internal 
crisis would be a mistake, and an unfortunate one at that.
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